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"[Mixed martial arts] has grown up. The rules have been adopted to give
its athletes better protections and to ensure fairer competition."'
I. Introduction
One of the most important figures in contemporary sports is a pudgy and
passionate bald man named Dana White. White is not an athlete; he is the
president and part owner of the Ultimate Fighting Championship ("UFC").2
The UFC is the country's largest promoter of America's newest and fastest-
growing sport: mixed martial arts ("MMA").3
MMA is a hybrid combat sport whose participants engage in and combine
a variety of fighting disciplines within one match.4  Contrary to the
perceptions of the uninformed, MMA has many, many rules-a fact White
will proudly declare at any available opportunity.5
1. Gareth Davies, Combat Night Proves a Hit, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Nov. 20, 2007, at 14
(quoting senator John McCain). Senator McCain was originally a fierce opponent of MMA,
criticizing it in 1994 as a "visual feast of broken bones and blood" that runs "until there is a
designated winner, according to the company's press release, by means of knockout, surrender,
doctor's intervention, or death." Health and Safety of Professional Boxing: Hearings Before the Comm. on
Commerce, Science, and Tranp., 103d Cong. 2 (1994) (statement of Sen. John McCain about MMA).
2. White and billionaires Lorenzo Fertitta and Frank Fertitta Ii (who also own Station
Casinos, Inc.) own ninety percent of the UFC, having recently sold a ten-percent stake to Flash
Entertainment, an Abu Dhabi entertainment company. Arnold M. Knightly, UFC Sells 10% to
Mideast Company, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, Jan. 11, 2010, available at http://www.lvrj.com/
nevs/breaking news/UFC-sels-10-percent-to-Mideast-company-81192552.html. The current
ownership breakdown between White and the Fertittas has not been disclosed. Id. Prior to the ten-
percent sale to Flash Entertainment, Mr. White owned ten percent and the Fertittas ninety percent.
Matthew Miller, Ullimate Cash Machine, FORBES, May 5, 2008, at 80, 80, 82. Zuffa, LLC ("Zuffa") is
the corporate holding company used by the Fertittas to operate the UFC. Id. at 82. Zuffa acquired
the UFC in 2001. Id.
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 467.00285 (2008) (defining "mixed martial arts" as
"unarmed combat involving the use.., of a combination of techniques from different disciplines of
the martial arts"). Such disciplines include, for example, kickboxing, wrestling, karate, and jiu-jitsu.
5. See Part Ii, infra. See also Gregory H. Bledsoe et al., Incidence of Injuy in Professional Mixed
Martial Arts Competitions, 5 J. SPORTS SCIENCE & MED. 136, 139 (2006), available at
http://www.jssm.org/combat/1/18/v5combat-18.pdf ("Though initially promoted as brutal, no-
holds-barred contests, Mixed Martial Arts competitions in the United States have changed
dramatically and now have improved regulations to minimize injury."). White and others at Zuffa (see
supra note 2) have done little to correct the common belief that they were the first to add rules and
obtain state sanction for what had previously been a banned, no-rules game. This common belief is
wrong. Prior to acquisition of the UFC in 2001 by Zuffa, the state of New Jersey had already
sanctioned the sport of MMA, and the UFC under its prior ownership had already instituted many of
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For better or worse, White is the face of the UFC, coming to public
prominence as a result of his memorable onscreen role in the UFC's flagship
reality television series, The Ultimate Fighter. On the show, aspiring MMA
athletes, not under contract with the UFC, live together in a large house, train
under the tutelage of established fighters who serve as coaches, and then
compete in a tournament held over the course of several weeks, with the
winner receiving a UFC contract. 6 During the show's first season in 2005,
White's appearances demonstrated his infectious passion for the sport and
foreshadowed how tirelessly he would work to promote its appeal. The
unfiltered vigor of his enthusiasm has kept him in the public eye ever since. 7
The Ultimate Fighter, however, has accomplished a great deal more than
introducing the world to the salty VAite: it has educated millions of new
viewers about the evolution of MIA from spectacle to sport. Unlike earlier
MMA competitions, in which talentless barflies swung wildly at mustached
opponents who claimed to be ninjas or assassins, The Ultimate Fighter
showcased a rules-oriented, physically challenging athletic competition with
hard-working, devoted competitors. Viewers noticed the difference, and liked
what they saw. The April 2005 season finale of the show-a live card of
exciting bouts on the male-oriented Spike TV-attracted over three million
viewers. 8 American appetite for MMA was whetted.
Since then, by any measure, the UFC (and MMA in general) can only be
described as ascendant. The UFC's television programs on Spike TV continue
to draw viewers, and the UFC's pay-per-view events in recent years have been
astonishingly successful. Although the UFC is privately held and does not
release pay-per-view revenues, it reportedly "generated $300 million in pay-
per-view revenue in 2008, surpassing both boxing and pro wrestling for the
second straight year."9  In July 2009, the company's UFC 100 blockbuster
pay-per-view card reportedly attracted approximately 1.6 million buys, among
the rules in effect today. See Part I.A., infra. Today, MMA is certainly more heavily regulated than it
was during the sport's infancy. This, no doubt, is partially due to the admirable efforts of Zuffa. But
significant rules and regulation were in place before Zuffa arrived on the scene. See Part IA., infra,
and infra note 52, with accompanying text.
6. See generaly, The Ultimate Fighter, Season 1: The Quest Begins (Spike TV television broadcast Jan.
17, 2005). See also Don Kaplan, Spike Gets in the Ring, THE N.Y. POST,June 28, 2004, at 89.
7. White's energy often manifests itself in aggressive criticism. For example, he once
remarked: "I don't like Showtime. I don't like 'em. That's the only reason I even fuck around with
them and do what I do because I want to kick them in their balls." Zach Arnold, Dana White Sounds
Off on Showime and Strikeforce on CBS 11/7 Show, FIGHTOPINION.COM, Sept. 18, 2009, http://
www.fightopinion.com/2009/09/18/dana-white-sounds-off-on-showtime-and-strikeforce-on-cbs-
117-show/.
8. Press Release, UFC & Spike TV, Spike TV and UFC Announce Strategic Partnership, (May
3, 2005), (http://www.ufc.com/index.cfm?fa=news.detail &gid=1218) (noting peak viewership of
3.3 million for The Ultimate Fighter season one finale).
9. Sean Gregory & James Osborne, Ullimate Fighting's Cold War Gets Hoiter, TIME, July 10,
2009, available at http://www.time.com/time/printout/ 0,8816,1909703,00.html.
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the most viewed pay-per-view sporting events ever. 10  In 2008, Forbes
estimated the UFC to be worth $1 billion." Today that number is almost
certainly higher.
In terms of athletic skill, the UFC's five current champions-heavyweight
Brock Lesnar, fight heavyweight Lyoto Machida, middleweight Anderson
Silva, welterweight Georges St. Pierre, and lightweight B. J. Penn-are all
patently world-class athletes. MMA also has pop culture salience: former light
heavyweight champions Chuck "Iceman" Liddell and Forrest Griffin both
recently wrote popular books.' 2 When White desperately tried and failed to
sign a Russian heavyweight named Fedor Emelianenko-the best MMA
fighter not under UFC contract, and arguably the best pound-for-pound
MMA fighter in the world-it received widespread and critical media
attention, including from the thoughtful Slate.com.13 There is hardly a greater
sign of cultural relevance for a professional sport than roster criticism by
mainstream media.
Of course, MMVLA is more than the UFC. Calling MMA "ultimate
fighting" is akin to calling a tissue a "Kleenex" or a photocopy a "Xerox."
MIA promotions, other than the UFC, have put on events, and countless
training gyms have arisen around the country. One promotion, Elite XC,
landed a network television deal with CBS in 2008, an historic first.' 4 Another
promotion, Strikeforce-which recently inked a deal with CBS-put on the
biggest MMA female match in history this summer, in which Christine
"Cyborg" Santos defeated Gina Carano.15  Heralded director Steven
Soderbergh subsequently cast the comely Carano as the heroine in his
upcoming film Knockout. 16
This Article is a searching treatment of the history, legitimacy, and
regulation of MMA. In Part II, this article explains the history and
10. E-mail from David Meltzer, Publisher, Wrestling Observer Newsletter, to author (Sept. 27,
2009, 20:59 CST) (on file with author).
11. See Miller, supra note 2, at 80.
12. See generally CHUCK LIDDELL & CHAD MILLMAN, ICEMAN: MY FIGHTING LIFE (2008) and
FORREST GRIFFIN, GOT FIGHT?: THE 50 ZEN PRINCIPLES OF HAND-TO-FACE COMBAT (2009).
13. Tim Marchman, The Not-Quite-Ultimate Fighting Championship, SLATE, Aug. 19, 2009,
http://www.slate.com/id/2225717/ (discussing the UFC-Emelianenko negotiations).
14. See David Meltzer, Elite XC Down for the Count, YAHOO! SPORTS, Oct. 21, 2008,
http://sports.yahoo.com/mma/news?slug=dm-eitexcl02008&prov=yhoo&type=lgns (reporting on
CBS deal). Elite XC, however, recently folded. See id.
15. SeeJosh Gross, Cybog's Upset of Carano Could Bode Wellfor Women's MMAI, SI.COM, Aug. 17,
2009, http://sportsifustrated.cnn.com/2009/writers/josh gross/08/16/strikeforce.women/index.
html (discussing Santos-Carano result) and David Meltzer, Fedor's Strikeforce Debut Airs on CBS,
YAHOO! SPORTS, Sept. 17, 2009 http://ca.sports.yahoo.com/mma/news?slug=dm-
fedorfight09l709&prov=yhoo&type=lgns (discussing CBS-Strikeforce deal).
16. Michael Fleming, Soderbegh Hits Up Carano for Film, VARIETY, Sept. 7, 2009,
http://www.variety.com/article/VR1118008212.htrl?categoryid= 123 6&cs=l.
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development of MMA, tracing it from its crude, brutish beginnings to its
current incarnation. In Part III, this article offers a pragmatic account of the
social utility and legitimacy of MMA, considers objections to its practice, and
compares it to other more established sports and entertainment in America.
In Part IV, this article reviews the state-based and administrative nature of
MMA regulation; in so doing, the objective is to identify and categorize three
conceptual groupings of existing MIMA regulation crucial to understanding the
relationship between legitimacy and oversight. The article concludes in Part V
by highlighting two reform possibilities-federalization and unionization-
that should be of interest to researchers, reformers, stakeholders, and fans
considering future development of the sport.
II. Understanding Mixed Martial Arts
Unarmed combat sports have a long history.17 Wrestling is one of the
oldest sports in the world;1 8 boxing bouts occurred in classic antiquity and
earlier;19 and sumo may be between 1,300 and 2,000 years old.20 Although
older combat sports remain popular, a new combat sport-MMA-has arisen
in the United States and around the globe in the past fifteen years.
MMA is so named because participants fluidly mix a variety of individual
martial arts disciplines (boxing, wrestling, karate, etc.) within one match.21 In
order to have any meaningful chance of success, present day competitors
must be operationally facile in three conceptual categories of combat: (1)
striking, i.e., using hands, feet, knees, and elbows to strike the opponent; (2)
17. MICHAEL B. POLUAKOFF, COMBAT SPORTS IN THE ANCIENT WORLD 7 (1995) ("Boxing,
wrestling and pankration, a sport that allowed a variety of unarmed fighting tactics, were the three
important forms of combat sport in the ancient world."). In several ways, pankration was the ancient
version of MMA. See L. JON WERTHEIM, BLOOD IN THE CAGE: MIXED MARTIAL ARTS, PAT
MILETICH, AND THE RISE OF THE UFC 13 (2007) (explaining that MMA can be traced to
pankration).
18. See, e.g., DONALD G. KYLE, SPORT AND SPECTACLE IN THE ANCIENT WORLD 26-27
(discussing Sumerian reference to wrestling circa 2700 B.C.); POLIAKOFF, supra note 17, at 10 (noting
that wrestling was mentioned on an Akkadian stone tablet over 3,700 years old).
19. Boxing was part of the ancient Olympics in 668 B.C. See, e.g., SHIRLEY GLUBOK & ALFRED
TAMARIN, OLYMPIC GAMES IN ANCIENT GREECE 77 (1976). There is even evidence of its practice
almost a thousand years before. See Kyle, supra note 18, at 40 (describing Minoan fresco of boxing
circa 1625 B.C.). By 500 A.D., Roman Emperor Theodoric banned boxing for being too violent.
The late Roman version, however, was obviously quite different than modern boxing. It included a
metal strap and a metal spike in the wraps, making many bouts fatal after one punch. See Michael T.
Flannery & Raymond C. O'Brien, Mandatory HIV Testing of Professional Boxers: An Unconstitutional Effort
to Regulate a Sport that Needs to Be Regulated, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 409, 420 (1998) (citations omitted).
20. CLYDE NEWTON & GERALD J. TOFF, DYNAMIC SUMO 48 (1994) (discussing sumo's
history).
21. The UFC Fact Sheet, http://wwwufc.com/index.cfm?fa=LearnUFC.Fact Sheet#section2
(last visited October 2, 2009) (describing MMA as "an intense and evolving combat sport in which
competitors use interdisciplinary forms of fighting that include jiu-jitsu, judo, karate, boxing,
kickboxing, wrestling and others to their strategic and tactical advantage in a supervised match").
wrestling, i.e., using power and position to take down and/or control one's
opponent; and (3) submission grappling, i.e., using leverage and various holds
to render the opponent unwilling or unable to continue. They must also have
the ability to defend against each type of attack. From this perspective, MMA
is itself a distinct cross-disciplinary martial art.
The expectation that professional MMA fighters will have skill in all three
areas-striking, wrestling, grappling-is fairly new, and essentially an
accidental outgrowth of the sport's origins. A brief review of MMA's modern
history, which begins in the early 1990s, will explain the initial negative
reaction to the sport and provide a fuller understanding of the sport as it
stands today.
A. History and Evolution
For years, one of the liveliest speculations by combat sport fans revolved
around whether an expert in one particular discipline (e.g., boxing) would win
a "real fight" against an expert in another discipline (e.g., wrestling).
Obviously, a trained boxer would defeat a trained wrestler in a boxing match.
Similarly, a trained wrestler would undoubtedly defeat a trained boxer in a
wrestling match. For many, however, the intriguing question was: What if a
boxer and a wrestler (or a karate master, a sumo, a judoka, etc.) simply fought,
with few or no rules?22 Who would win?
During the late nineteenth and throughout the twentieth centuries,
exhibition bouts between boxers, wrestlers, and other martial artists occurred
(most notoriously Muhammad Ali versus Japanese professional wrestler
Antonio Inoki).23 Since the contests often involved at least one participant
who routinely participated in "professional" (i.e., scripted) wrestling
matches, 24 few considered the outcomes of these infrequent bouts as credible
22. See, e.g., WERTHEIM, supra note 17, at 55-56 (describing UFC co-founder Art Davies'
fascination with the question of who would prevail in a "sporting contest among experts" of
different fighting disciplines).
23. According to promoter Bob Arum, the Ali-Inoki match, although billed as a legitimate
contest, was intended to be fixed with a "script for the fight" that involved dramatic twists and turns.
THOMAS HAUSER, MUHAMMAD ALi: His LIFE AND TIMES 336-37 (1992). But allegedly Ali had
qualms about deceiving the public, and immediately prior to the fight he refused to cooperate. Id. at
337. Arum accordingly claims the ensuing match was real-and incredibly boring, because Inoki
essentially laid on his back kicking at Ali's legs for fifteen rounds while Ali threw "six punches." Id.
The fight was declared a draw and taken seriously by no one. Id.
24. For more than 100 years, "professional" wrestlers have engaged in bouts whose outcomes
(and often specifics of the match) are predetermined. See general# ScoTT M. BEEKMAN, RINGSIDE:
A HISTORY OF PROFESSIONAL WRESTLING 38-41 (2006) (discussing origins of cooperative
outcomes in professional wrestling). Many early professional wrestlers had legitimate wrestling
backgrounds and likely engaged in some legitimate contests. Id. Yet by the early twentieth century,
most professional wrestling matches' outcomes were predetermined by agreement, to enhance their
entertainment appeal. Id.
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answers to the question of combat discipline supremacy. 25 Thus, in the early
1990s, for many American sports fans, the question remained: Which fighting
discipline was best?
The UFC organization was formed in America to specifically answer that
question. 26  Not coincidentally, one of the UFC co-founders-Rorion
Gracie-felt quietly confident that he had the answer. Rorion was a member
of the Gracies, a Brazilian family who had spent decades practicing a little-
known (to Americans) martial art named Brazilian jiu-jitsu ("Bjj"). 27 BJJ is a
martial art that focuses on submitting one's opponent; its practitioners use
positioning and body weak points (e.g., neck, shoulder, arm, knee, ankle) to
pull opponents to the ground and then subdue them with a series of chokes,
holds, and cranks. 28  In Brazil, the Gracie family, over many years,
participated in a series of formal and informal challenges with various fighters
in no-rules or minimal-rules bouts and concluded that an experienced BJJ
fighter would likely defeat the practitioner of a different combat discipline. 29
With two American executives, Art Davie and Robert Meyrowitz, Rorion
Gracie agreed to stage and promote a true combat tournament, with masters
of different disciplines competing.30 Rorion's intent was to include a Gracie
BJJ expert, who Rorion expected to win, and thus gain worldwide renown for
BJJ and the Gracie schools that taught it.31 That tournament, which brought
together eight fighters for a one-night tournament with a prize of $50,000,
was called simply "the Ultimate Fighting Championship," and it occurred in
Denver, Colorado, on November 12, 1993.32 As Rorion Gracie expected, the
25. For example, early judo practitioner Mitsuya Maeda traveled the world giving fight
exhibitions, winning most. But it was "hard to say which of the fights were legitimate contests and
which were part of his wrestling act." JONATHAN SNOWDEN, TOTAL MMA: INSIDE ULTIMATE
FIGHTING 13 (Michael Holmes ed., 2008). There certainly were contests that were legitimate, most
famously a mid-century match in Brazil between Helio Gracie and judo legend Masahiko Kimura. Id.
at 20. Kimura-for whom today's "Kimura" submission hold of the shoulder is named-prevailed.
Id. But, owing to the infrequency or obscurity of legitimate bout results, the question of which
martial art was supreme remained, for virtually all American fans, an open question.
26. Id. at 26 (explaining the UFC was originally intended to be a "battle of styles in which the
various martial arts would compete for supremacy").
27. See Todd Martin, UFC Retrospective Series Part 1: The Pioneer, CBSSPORTS.COM, May 18, 2009,
http://www.cbssports.com/mma/story/1 1761069 (discussing fighting pedigree of Gracie family).
28. Cf. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3773:7-01(A) (2009) (describing BJJ).
29. See SNOWDEN, supra note 25, at 14-23.
30. See WERTHEIM, supra note 17, at 55-57.
31. Id. at 56 (noting that Rorion believed the UFC fights "would be the perfect format to
demonstrate the superiority of Gracie jiu-jitsu"). See also SNOWDEN, supra note 25, at 28-29
(explaining that Rorion "saw in the UFC an opportunity to expose to the world the truths and
fallacies inherent in contemporary martial arts theory").
32. See David Meltzer, First UFC Forever Altered Combat Sports, YAHOO! SPORTS, Nov. 12, 2007,
http://sports.yahoo.com/mma/news;_ylt=AuvUi2TrSN_ILBVsuNLmsjk9Eol4?slug=dm-earlyufc
11 1207&prov=yhoo&type=lgns [hereinafter Meltzer, First UFC] (describing UFC 1). The first UFC
has subsequently been renamed "UFC 1 - The Beginning."
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BJJ entrant-176-pound Royce Gracie, Rorion's brother-won the
tournament after defeating several larger men: catch-wrestler Ken Shamrock,
boxer Art Jimmerson, and savate expert Gerard Gordeau. 33
As originally conceived, the UFC was largely intended as a curiosity,
rather than a sport.34  Its primary objective was merely to answer two
questions: (1) which martial arts discipline was best and (2) who was the
world's "best fighter." The event was intended to be "a battle of styles" and
representative of "real" fighting, therefore few rules constrained the
combatants. 35 Accordingly, early events were billed as no-rules, anything-
goes, judge-free competitions; there was a deliberate attempt to compare the
bouts to quasi-legal street fights, as opposed to skilled athletic contests. 36
These early fights did not take place in a ring, but in the "Octagon" (a mat
surrounded by an eight-sided "cage"); there were no weight classes, time
limits, or judges; competitors did not wear protective gear; and bouts could
only be stopped by "knockout, submission or a fighter's corner throwing in
the towel." 37
Promotional efforts to attract attention highlighted the danger perceived
to arise from unarmed combat with such minimal rules, i.e., the "bloodsport"
nature of the contests. 38 One particularly infamous pitch highlighted the
possibility that a participant could die in a UFC fight.3 9  Such vulgar
promotional efforts, combined with the unusual spectacle of seeing men-
some of whom were evidently unfit or unskilled 4 -- engage in bloody bare-
knuckle fights inside of a cage, resulted in a notoriety for the UFC that
33. Id.
34. Id. (reporting Campbell McLaren, the head of marketing for the first UFC, as saying he did
not believe the UFC was a new sport and that the "last thing we want is for this to be a sport").
35. See WERTHEIM, supra note 17, at 56 (describing UFC co-founder Davie as viewing the
tournament as "[e]ssentially no-holds barred, may the best man win"). The rules of the early UFCs
varied, but they were extremely minimal. See Meltzer, First UFC, supra note 32. Eye-gouging,
however, was always prohibited. Id.
36. See SNOWDEN, supra note 25, at 38-39 (describing the original marketing approach of the
early UFC events as promoting "blood and violenceol").
37. See Meltzer, First UFC, supra note 32. See also CLYDE GENTRY III, NO HOLDS BARRED:
ULTLMATE FIGHTING AND THE MARTIAL ARTS REVOLUTION 51-52 (Milo Books 2005) (2002)
(discussing first UFC event); WERTHEIM, sepra note 17, at 56.
38. Todd Martin, UFC Retrospective Series Part 2: The Dark Days, CBSSPORTS.COM, May 25,
2009, http://www.cbssports.com/mma/story/11786392 (explaining that early UFCs were promoted
as "bloody spectacle" rather than a sport).
39. On the videotape release of the first UFC event, the tape's sleeve boasts that victory in the
matches was attainable by "knockout, submission, or death." Meltzer, First UFC, supra note 32.
40. For example, at UFC 8, a grossly overweight competitor named Thomas Ramirez
ludicrously claimed to have been undefeated in 400 fights. Ramirez, a bouncer from Puerto Rico,
was matched against Don Frye, a former collegiate wrestler who also had trained in boxing. Frye
knocked Ramirez unconscious in seconds in an embarrassingly uncompetitive contest. See
ULTIMATE FIGHTING CHAMPIONSHIP CLASSICS, VOL. 8 (Lions Gate 1996) (UFC 8 event video
including the Frye-Ramirez bout).
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accomplished two things: (1) it convinced some fans and legitimate athletes
that a true sport could arise and evolve from the UFC's imperfect start, and
(2) it convinced various politicians and sportswriters that the early UFC (and
MMA) was a disgusting spectacle with no place in American sporting life.
Regarding the latter, Senator John McCain denounced MMA as a "visual
feast of broken bones and blood" 41 and more famously as "human
cockfighting. ' '4 2  Others similarly disapproved.43  As a result of political
pressure, cable companies refused to carry UFC pay-per-views-undermining
the revenue base for the company and threatening the viability of the
organization. 44 Nonetheless, while political and commercial troubles menaced
the UFC, the underlying sport of MMA began to evolve along several lines.
First, MMA competitors began to acquire cross-disciplinary skills.
Kickboxers learned to wrestle, wrestlers learned BJJ, BJJ artists learned to
kickbox, and so on. Generally these early cross-disciplinary participants
would hail from one fight discipline but pick up defensive capability in other
disciplines in order to compete effectively. In other words, a kickboxer would
learn to defend against a wrestler's takedowns and a BJJ artist's submission
attacks, a wrestler would learn to avoid strikes and submissions, a BJJ artist
would learn to defend against strikes and takedowns, and so forth. By
developing such cross-disciplinary skills, a competitor would no longer be
totally vulnerable to a practitioner of a foreign art should the latter gain an
advantageous position in a particular match. As such, bouts were more likely
to be closely contested and, thus, attractive to paying fans. As one might
expect, the physical size of the competitors began to play a larger role in
determining bout outcomes as the sport evolved and participants familiarized
themselves with more fighting techniques. The importance of weight classes
in promoting competitive bouts became self-evident and they were soon
used.45
41. Health and Safeoy of Professional Boxing: Hearings Before the Comm. on Commerce, Science, and
Transp., 103d Cong. 2 (1994) (statement of Sen. John McCain about MMA).
42. Davies, supra note 1 (reporting that McCain referred to MMA as "human cockfighting").
43. See, e.g., James Dao, Senate Chief in Albany, Reversing Himsef, Says He Backs a Ban on Ulimate
Fighting, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1997, at B7 (quoting ban advocate State Senator Roy M. Goodman
describing MMA as "human cockfighting, a disgraceful, animalistic and disgusting contest which can
result in severe injuries to contestants'). See also Woody Paige, State's Dead# Sin: No Commission, No
Conscience, DENVER POST, Dec. 1, 1995, at C1 (describing MMA as "a disgusting display of... pay-
per-view human cockfighting").
44. Greg Beato, Bleeding into the Mainstream, REASON (October 2007), available at
http://www.reason.com/news/show/122016.html (explaining that, because of widespread political
denunciations of MIMLA, in 1997 large cable operators such as TCI and Time Warner refused to show
UFC pay-per-view events and almost drove the UFC out of business).
45. The UFC first used weight classes at UFC 12. There were two weight classes: a class for
competitors 200 pounds or more, and a class for competitors less than 200 pounds. See ULTIMATE
FIGHTING CLASSICS, VOL. 12 (Lions Gate 1997) (video of the UFC 12 event). See also Sean Lealos,
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Second, MMA promoters (including the UFC) began to realize that
various rules--e.g., a detailed list of certain prohibited moves (groin strikes,
small joint manipulation, head butts, etc.), an interventionist referee, etc.-
made the fights both more entertaining and competitive, without
compromising the underlying appeal of the contests. For example, after
Royce Gracie left the UFC, the next set of dominant competitors were
powerful wrestlers who would take their opponents to the ground, lay on top
of them, and pummel them with head butts or infrequent short punches.
Such matches lacked excitement (and the requirement of much skill beyond
the ability to perform a takedown), and thus head butts were soon
prohibited. 46 Similarly, referees were endowed with the authority to "stand
up" the competitors if little fighting effort was being made on the ground,
giving an advantage to striking disciplines. 47  Another rule change that
benefitted striking-which was, and is, widely believed to be attractive to
casual and devoted fans alike-was to require lightweight, open-fingered
gloves (to permit grappling). 48 This requirement was adopted because striking
an opponent's body with a bare hand was extremely likely to result in a hand
injury that could end an otherwise competitive and exciting bout.49
Third, MMA became more palatable to legislators and regulators because
of the adoption of the rules discussed above. After 1997-when most cable
distributors, because of political pressure, refused to carry MMA cards on pay-
per-view-MMA entered a "dark age" where the survival of the sport in the
United States was in question.5 0 By the late 1990s, promoters believed that
the sport's survival depended on persuading sport regulators in New Jersey
and Nevada that MMA had progressed from a no-rules spectacle to a rule-
bound sport deserving of official sanction.5' In 2001, the sport was
sanctioned by the Nevada State Athletic Commission ("NSAC"); shortly
DVD Review: UFC 11 and 12, CHUD.COM, March 11, 2009, http://www.chud.com/
articles/articles/18455/1 /DVD-REVIEW-UFC-1 1-and-12/Pagel html; Matt McEwen, The History of
the UFC: UFC XII-Judgment Day, 411MANIA.COM, July 9, 2007, http://www.411mania.com/
MMA/videoreviews/56843/The-History-of-the-UFC:-UFC-XII---Judgement-Day.htm.
46. DAVID MAYEDA & DAVID CHING, FIGHTING FOR ACCEPTANCE: MIXED MARTIAL
ARTISTS AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 146 (2008) (explaining that former UFC champion
Randy Couture believed that head butts were wisely banned because they require no skill).
47. MMA Terms and Definitions (defining "stand-up rule'), http://elitemmareferees.com/
index.php?option=comcontent&view=article&id=44&Itemid=53 Oast visited Jan 20, 2010).
48. See, e.g., SNOWDEN, supra note 25, at 87.
49. Id. (explaining optional and then mandatory use of gloves, which "protects the striker's
hand, not the recipient's head').
50. See, e.g., David Plotz, Fight Clubbed, SLATE, Nov. 17, 1999 (describing late 1990s UFC as
"increasingly desperate" and having "gone underground").
51. SNOWDEN, supra note 25, at 143-47.
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thereafter, cable companies agreed to again show MMA on pay-per-view.5 2
Four years later, in 2005, The Ullimate Fighter re-introduced millions to
contemporary MMA; seven years later, in 2008, UFC pay-per-view revenue
exceeded that of boxing.53
B. Contemporary Players
Understanding contemporary MMA necessarily requires familiarity with
its cast of characters, which are briefly described below. The first category
consists of the athletes themselves. 54 Except for those fighters at the very top
of the profession, the financial rewards are extremely modest.55 Indeed, even
for some athletes competing in the UFC-the most successful and wealthiest
domestic promotional organization-payouts per fight, with only a few fights
a year for a given athlete, are under $10,000. For example, at UFC 100, the
biggest MMA event in history, three fighters-Paulo Thiago, Matt Grice, and
T. J. Grant-received fight purses of $8,000, $7,000, and $5,000
respectively.5 6 And in a recent UFC card televised on Spike TV, the loser of
the main event, Melvin Guillard, received only $14,000.57
Few fighters possess the necessary skills to capably manage their
professional interests. As such, the second category of M IA player consists
of the managers and agents who handle the administrative and business side
of a fighter's career-such as striking deals with MMA promoters or
52. The first sanctioned MMA show in New Jersey was not held by the UFC; it was held by a
promotional organization called the IFC. Id at 147. Before being acquired by Zuffa-see Miller,
supra note 2-the UFC, under its prior ownership, held its first event sanctioned by New Jersey in
November 2000. Id. Accordingly, it is not the case that MMA had no rules and no sanctioning
before Zuffa acquired the UFC, as is commonly believed. It is true that in 2001, when Zuffa
acquired the UFC, MMA was not yet sanctioned in Nevada. See, e.g., Todd Martin, UFC Retrospective
Series Part 3: The New Ownership, CBSSPORTS.COM, June 1, 2009, http://wwv.cbssports.com/
mma/story/11809856 (reporting that Zuffa purchased the UFC in January 2001 and "scored
victories" when Nevada subsequently sanctioned MMA). On the heels of Nevada's sanctioning of
MMA, cable pay-per-view providers agreed to carry UFC events. Id.
53. See Gregory & Osborne, supra note 9.
54. Most fighters do not train alone: Many are affiliated with MMA training gyms, from whom
each fighter receives athletic instruction, training, and in-fight advice.
55. See, e.g., Gary Wimsett, Follow the Mongy, FIVEOUNCESOFPAIN.COM, May 12, 2009,
http://fiveouncesofpain.com/2009/05/12/folow-the-money/ (explaining that many fighters "either
eke out a modest living or struggle from fight to fight').
56. UFC 100 Fighters Salaries: Lesnar and St-Pierre Get Top Paydys in $1.8 Million Payroll,
MMAJUNKE.COM, July 13, 2009, http://mmajunkie.com/news/15498/ufc-100-fighters-salaries-
brock-lesnar-and-georges-st-pierre-top-earners-from-x-x-million-payrol.mma. Such pay does not
include endorsement contracts, profit-sharing on pay-per-revenues, or other compensation. But the
vast majority of professional fighters are unlikely to receive significant, if any, compensation outside
of their fight purses.
57. UFC Fight Night 19 Fighters Salaries: Nate Quary Tops Event's $476,000 Payroll,
MMAJUNKIE.COM, Sept. 21, 2009, http://mmajunkie.com/nevs/16263/ufc-fight-night-19-fighters-
salaries-nate-quarry-tops-events-476000-payroll.mma.
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sponsors-often for a percentage of the fighter's purses or sponsorship
deals.58 In addition to business acumen, desirable managers/agents are
expected to have fertile relationships with MMA promoters and/or potential
sponsors. Because fight purses are not particularly large, most fighters need
the extra money earned from even modest sponsorship arrangements.
Unfortunately, many unestablished fighters-either those beginning their
careers or those who lack the talent to compete at the sport's highest levels-
likely lack capable, if any, representation to assist them in their professional
development.
The third category of MMA actor consists of the promotional
organizations (often called "promotions" or "promoters"), which fund,
promote, and stage MMA events.5 9  Such promotional organizations
contractually engage fighters to compete on their cards, and the contractual
terms between a promotion and a fighter can vary significantly depending on
the organization and the fighter signing the agreement. 6° By far the largest
current promoter in the United States is the UFC. The UFC is privately held
and does not release its financial information, but in 2008, Forbes estimated
the company to be worth $1 billion. 61 Other domestic promoters include
Strikeforce, which currently has a broadcast deal with CBS, and Bellator
Fighting Championship, a tournament-centric MMA promotion. 62
Regulatory officials associated with licensing, rule-making, oversight, and
discipline constitute the fourth category of MMA player. Regulation in MMA
is an active enterprise, with promoters routinely interfacing with regulators on
compliance matters. The UFC, for example, employs former Nevada State
Athletic Commission executive director Marc Ratner as its Vice President of
Regulatory Affairs. 63
Few dispute that state sanction and regulation of MMA was pivotal in the
sport's re-emergence and burgeoning cultural acceptance, and there is little
58. Cf NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 467.0028 (2009) (defining "manager"). See also Mike Harris, End
of an Era: Fighter-Manager Handshake Deals Die as MMAI Grows, SHERDOG.COM, Jan. 13, 2009,
http://www.sherdog.com/news/articles/2/End-of-an-Era-Fighter-Manager-Handshake-Deals-Die-
as-MMA-Grows-1 5757 (discussing role of managers and agents); Gary Wimsett, Choosing Management:
An MMA Fighter's Guide, FIVEOUNCESOFPAIN.COM, May 27, 2009, http://fiveouncesofpain.com/
2009/05/27/choosing-management-an-mma-fighters-guide (discussing importance of selecting a
quality manager).
59. Cf. NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 467.0031 (2009) (defining "promoter"). See also id. § 467.052
(promoter must demonstrate, inter alia, "financial stability" to obtain license).
60. See, e.g., Gary Wimsett, Promotions and the Use of Exclusive Fighter Agreements in MAA,
F1VEOUNCESOFPAIN.COM, May 19, 2009, http://fiveouncesofpain.com/2009/05/19/promotions-
and-the-use-of-exclusive-fighter-agreements-in-mma (discussing promotional contracts).
61. See Miller, supra note 2, at 81.
62. Bellator Fighting Championships, http://belator.com (last visited Jan 14, 2010).
63. Press Release, UFC, Marc Ratner to Join Zuffa, LLC, (Mar. 24, 2006)
(http://www.ufc.com/index.cfm?fa=news.detail&gid=2377).
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question that sensible regulatory oversight will remain crucial to MMA's
continued development. However, an ever-present concern with regulators is
that they will be beholden, informally or formally, to those who they are
regulating.64 Like elsewhere in the modern regulatory state, it is difficult to
limit the influence powerful private actors might have on regulators. In
addition, regulators are state employees, and the state has a financial interest in
holding attractive bouts because the state collects fees and taxes in connection
with MMA events. Accordingly, the regulator is often not a fully disinterested
party. While some existing regulation has attempted to address this concern,
see Part III.C., infra, as not-yet Justice Louis Brandeis said almost a century
ago, "[s]unlight is said to be the best of disinfectants." 65 Happily, MMA
bloggers and journalists have taken this principle to heart, practicing an acute
vigilance in reporting and criticizing regulatory conduct perceived as
incompetent or biased. 66 So it should continue.
III. The Legitimacy of Mixed Martial Arts
For some, MMA still appears more like barbarism than sport; recently an
opinion piece in The Boston Globe called it "human dog-fighting," 67 and in
New York, professional MNvIA remains illegal.68 While MIA certainly may
64. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & F. Clayton Miller, 'I'll Sell It to You at Cost": Legal Methods to Promote
Retail Markup Disclosure, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 1047, 1070 n.87 (1990) ("Regulated agencies . .. can be
,captured' by the very firms they are mandated to regulate."). Seegeneraly Sam Peltzman, The Growth of
Government, 23 J.L. & ECON. 209 (1980) (discussing administrative capture); George J. Stigler, The
Theog of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. So. 3 (1971) (discussing administrative
capture).
65. LouIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY, AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92
(Frederick A. Stokes Co., 1914) (1913).
66. For example, when California State Athletic Commission Executive Officer Armando
Garcia resigned in November 2008, one might expect encomiums from the MMA community, as Mr.
Garcia "was instrumental in the passage of MMA regulations in California in late 2005 and oversaw
the first regulated event in March 2006 .... ." Loretta Hunt, Garcia Resigns from CSAC,
SHERDOG.COM, Nov. 10, 2009, http://www.sherdog.com/news/news/garcia-resigns-from-csac-
15087. Not so; Garcia was roundly criticized as incompetent and his resignation cheered. See, e.g.,
E-mail from Zach Arnold, Publisher, FightOpinion.com, to author (Sept. 26, 2009 18:33 CS'T)
(summarizing reasons why MMA observers were critical of Garcia) (on file with author); Posting of
Cannon Jacques to BloodyElbow.com, http://wvw.bloodyelbow.com/2008/11/9/657258/
armando-garcia-leaves-csac (Nov. 10, 2008, 08:24 EST) (comments applauding Garcia's departure).
67. Peter Funt, Op-Ed., The Disturbing Appeal of Human Doglghting' BOSTON GLOBE, July 29,
2009, at Letters 10 (citation omitted) (criticizing MMA). Dogfighting and cockfighting analogies,
while rhetorically colorful, are inapt. Animals are incapable of consenting to the risk of harm to
pursue athletic ends; humans are.
68. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 8905-a (McKinney 2008) (banning professional "combative
sports," which includes MMVA). A movement is afoot, however, to lift the ban. See, e.g., Chris Parry,
Legislative Deadlock Places Hurdle Before New York AIMA Regulation Bill, VANCOUVER SUN, June 23,
2009, available at http://www.vancouversun.com/Sports/Legislative+deadlock+places+
hurdle+before+York+regulation+bill/ 1 725748/story.html (discussing status of efforts to change
NY ban on MMA).
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not appeal to all on grounds of taste, this author oft-made claim that MMA is
somehow inherently illegitimate in any meaningful sense of the term. MMA is
a legitimate sport/activity, meaning that, in its current incarnation, MMA does
not offend customary notions of what Americans accept as sport or
entertainment. In comparative terms, MMA is no different (and certainly not
more objectionable) than many other forms of sport and entertainment found
flourishing on the broad stage of American culture. 69
A. Social Utility
Societies have long prized athletic valor and physical competition-i.e.,
sport-for reasons large and small. 70 Because few dispute that sport qua sport
is socially valuable, only a brief acknowledgement of its utility is necessary
here. To wit, athletics promote many things considered positive, such as
recreational satisfaction and physical fitness. 71  But sport is more than
enjoyable exertion; it is also competitive, goal-oriented, and rule-bound. The
competitive aspect of sport encourages practice and commitment to craft in
pursuit of the maximum development of one's potential, so that victory
and/or the meeting of performance goals are more likely. 72 For the same
reason, sport also promotes strategic and tactical thinking, and often the
acceptance of instruction from a more knowledgeable practitioner. Moreover,
sport familiarizes athletes with the notion of rules, and seems likely to instill
an appreciation for the benefits of observing agreed-upon rules; i.e., fair play.
These lessons of sport-pushing oneself, disciplined dedication to craft,
improved strategic thinking, understanding the value of fair play-have long
been believed (or hoped) to beneficially affect the athlete's outside-of-sport
conduct.7 3 Sport's lessons are further hoped to exert a positive, if more
69. My analysis is pragmatic and comparative by design. I deliberately do not make or consider
the libertarian-style argument that, even if we assume MIMA utterly lacks utility and is life-
threateningly dangerous, it is nonetheless a legitimate activity to the extent that it reflects the choice
of the two consenting contestants. It is not that I necessarily reject such an argument; rather, I
simply think it need not be reached. Given MMA's current characteristics, there is in my view no
persuasive claim that it is materially different than the other sports and activities American society
currently accepts as legitimate.
70. See, e.g., GRAHAM MCFEE, SPORT, RULES AND VALUES: PHILOSOPHICAL
INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE NATURE OF SPORT 129-77 (2004) (discussing value of sport). See also
generally WILLIAMJOHN MORGAN ET AL., ETHICS IN SPORT (2001).
71. See, e.g., Stimson v. Carlson, 11 Cal. App. 4th 1201, 1206 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (describing
sport as a "socially desirable activity that improves the mental and physical well-being of its
participants").
72. See, e.g., David Horton, Extreme Sports and the Assumpion of Risk: A Bluepint, 38 U.S.F. L.
REV. 599, 614 (2004) (citation omitted) (noting that sport fosters "self-monitoring, goal-setting,
problem solving, and self-reward').
73. Cf. EDWARD J. SHEA, ETHICAL DECISIONS IN SPORT: INTERSCHOLASTIC,
INTERCOLLEGIATE, OLYMPIC AND PROFESSIONAL 132 (1996) (discussing the positive "self-
realization" aspect of sport). Certainly there exist criticisms of how modern sports are practiced-
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modest, influence on spectators, in addition to the vicarious pleasure fans
experience when watching-often with friends or family-a favored sport,
team, or athlete.
For these reasons and others, American society accepts the presumptive
utility of sport. Combat sports historically have had an additional, acutely
instrumental justification: utility in preparing practitioners for actual military
combat, the ancient kind, fought with hand to hand weapons.7 4 Today, of
course, unarmed combat is of lesser military value than it was hundreds or
thousands of years ago (although the United States Army Modern Combatives
Program does teach a modified form of MMA).75 However, training and
competing in combat sports-particularly multidisciplinary MMA-does
increase a participant's ability to defend himself/herself in a situation where
(s)he may very well need to intentionally harm an attacker, which has obvious
instrumental value.
B. Objections and Responses
Against the broad presumptive utility of sport and the instrumental self-
defense utility of the specific sport of MMA, challenges to its legitimacy
should be considered. Objectors rarely present their complaints in formal
terms. Instead, critics brand MMA as illegitimate because it is "disgraceful" or
"bloodsport," or some similarly pejorative term designed to end, rather than
begin, a considered examination of the question.76 Nonetheless, this article
identifies and considers below four potential objections to MMA's legitimacy:
(1) the excessive danger of the sport, (2) the lack of skill required, (3) the
injurious intent of its competitors and a concomitant erosion of empathy and
anti-violence norms, and (4) the uninformed choices made by its practitioners.
1. Excessive Danger
Because virtually all sports pose some physical risk to participants, risk
alone does not undermine the legitimacy of a sporting contest between willing
athletes. Yet as the physical risk of a given sport becomes more acute,
objections to the propriety of the sport increase.77 Thus, perhaps the most
particularly the "win at all costs" mentality-but such criticism addresses sport's excesses, not the
fundamental utility and legitimacy of sport.
74. See, e.g., THOMAS ELYOT, THE GOVERNOR 60 (1962) (praising wrestling for use "in wars
or other necessity"); POLIAKOFF, supra note 17, at 23 (noting that wrestling "tests an array of martial
virtues: cunning, boldness, courage, self-reliance, and perseverance").
75. Michelle Tan, Lords of the Ring, ARlMY TIMES, Dec. 12, 2006, available at
http://www.armytimes.com/legacy/new/1-292925-2416338.php (describing United States Army
Combatives Program).
76. See supra notes 42 and 43.
77. For example, at the turn of the century, college football was considered excessively
dangerous, frequently criticized, and threatened with bans by state legislatures. See Kevin E. Broyles,
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popular legitimacy objection to MMA is that it is exceptionally dangerous, as
compared to other sports, and that its danger quotient exceeds some intuitive
limit about how dangerous a legitimate athletic contest should be.
Available evidence and considered examination reveal, however, that
MIMA is vastly less dangerous than it is perceived by critics to be. For
example, for all the concern about the sport being deadly, in the sixteen years
that MMA has been practiced in the United States, there has been exactly one
confirmed bout-related death. 78 Other sporting activities-such as hunting,
rodeo, boating, bicycling, and swimming-have had far more fatalities. 79
Of course, the relevant comparison is not absolute deaths, but deaths per
some quantum of activity; i.e., a fatality rate. One way to express a fatality rate
is deaths per 1,000 participants-and many are surprised to learn that, using
that metric, numerous mainstream sports have significant fatality rates. 80
There is currently no reliable data, however, on the precise volume of MMA
activity (in terms of either aggregate minutes or total participant count).
Accordingly, one cannot today calculate an MMIA fatality rate to compare to
the fatality rates of other sports. Even if one were to reliably estimate the
total volume of MMA activity to date, it might be too small to be confident
that the fatality rate was the true long-term rate.
Nonetheless, some inferences can be drawn. First, regarding sports or
athletic pursuits that have comparatively high numbers of fatalities-such as
hunting, horse-racing, rodeo, car-racing, mountaineering, and skydiving-
MMA is almost certainly less deadly. The reason is because in those sports,
NCAA Regulation of Intercollegiate Athletics: Time for a New Game Plan, 46 ALA. L. REV. 487, 489-90 &
n.16 (1995) (citations omitted) (discussing fatalities in turn of the century college football and the
early history of the NCAA). The IAAUS (the forerunner to the NCAA) was established to formalize
rules and improve game safety. Id. at 490.
78. David Meltzer, MMA Fighter Vasqueq Dies Weeks After Fight, YAHOO! SPORTS, Dec. 2, 2007,
http://sports.yahoo.com/mma/news?sug=dm-fighterdeathl20207&prov=yhoo&type=lgns. In the
1990s, in an unsanctioned bout in Kiev, Ukraine, an American named Douglas Dredge died
following a match, but there were indications of a pre-existing medical condition. Id.
79. In the year 2000 alone, for example, there were approximately ninety hunting fatalities,
800-900 bicycling fatalities, 800-900 boating fatalities, and over 1,000 swimming fatalities. SeeJames
A. Swan, Peaceful Arms: Hunting and Sport Shooting, 8 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 189, 192-93 (2003)
(collecting fatality data). See also Paul Harasim, Riding Out the Pain, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL,
Dec. 10, 2004, available at http://w-ww.reviewjournal.com/lvrjhome/2004/Dec-l 0-Fri-2004/news/
25435607.html (reporting on a research study finding fourteen rodeo deaths between 1981 and 2000).
80. Sports with significant fatality rates include horse-racing (12.8 fatalities per 1,000
participants), sports parachuting (12.3 fatalities per 1,000 participants), hang-gliding (5.6 fatalities per
1,000 participants), mountaineering (5.1 fatalities per 1,000 participants), scuba diving (1.1 fatalities
per 1,000 participants), motorcycle racing (0.7 fatalities per 1,000 participants), and college football
(0.3 fatalities per 1,000 participants). See Robert J. McCunney & Pearl K. Russo, Brain Injuries in
Boxing, 12 THE PHYSICIAN & SPORTS MED. J. 53, 57 (1984) (collecting fatality data). See also Thomas
A. Gonzales, Fatal Injuries in Competitive Sports, 146 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1506, 1510-11 (1951)
(concluding that, from 1918 to 1950, boxing produced fewer deaths, proportionately, than baseball
or football).
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the fatality risk arises from exposure to a massively powerful instrumentality
(e.g., a gun, a car, a horse, or a mountain) where loss of control of the
instrumentality exposes the athlete to profound and life-threatening physical
danger. To the extent that loss of control of the instrumentality is
systematically inherent in the sport-e.g., that it is simply impossible for a
jockey to always control and stay on his horse-fata/ injuries are a likely result.
In contrast, in combat sports, participants face risk of a lower magnitude (e.g.,
getting punched is less dangerous than getting trampled by a horse), but a
higher frequency (e.g., boxers get hit many times each fight, while jockeys
usually stay on their horses). Accordingly, combat sport risk tends to
correlate with accumulated blows. 81 While single and accumulated blows can
be damaging in other ways, they pose less overall fatality risk than does
infrequent exposure to profound risk (such as a parachute not opening during
a jump).82
Certainly, MMA puts its participants at considerable risk for certain non-
fatal injuries, 83 but recent research suggests that it is not appreciably more
dangerous than other combat sports commonly accepted as legitimate. 84
Indeed, even absent long-term studies, MMA is overwhelmingly likely to be
far less dangerous than boxing, which poses significant risk of brain injury.
Boxing involves considerably more blunt trauma to the head over a longer
period of time, and accumulated trauma is believed to be the driver of long-
term damage. 85 In contrast, accumulated head trauma in MIVIA is much less
likely, for several reasons. First, MMA incorporates maneuvers other than
striking, so in a given MMIA bout, far less blows will be thrown and absorbed
than in a comparable boxing or kickboxing match of similar length. Second,
MMA bouts are shorter than boxing matches, with correspondingly fewer
strikes exchanged. Third, MMA has fight-finishing offense other than
knockouts; bouts can end via submissions-moves that force an opponent to
81. See Robert G. Morrison, Medical and Public Health Aipects of Boxing, 255 J. AM. MED. ASS'N
2475, 2476-77 (1986) (explaining that brain damage in boxing rises with accumulation of blows). See
also Gregory H. Bledsoe et al., Incidence of Injugy in Prnfessional Mixed Martial Arts Cowpetiions, 5 J.
SPORTS SCI. & MED. 136, 140 (2006) (concluding that the "giving and receiving of high velocity
blows seems to be the best correlation of whether a sport will have an increased risk of [non-fatal]
injury.').
82. Kevin M. Walsh, Boxing: Regulating A Health HaZard, 11 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y
63, 67 (1994) (noting that few boxers "die due to injuries sustained while in the ring" and that "[tihe
fatality rate among American boxers .. .is similar to or lower than death rates among athletes in
other high-risk sports such as sky diving or motorcycle racing.").
83. Like in boxing, facial lacerations and hand injuries in MMA are very common. See Bledsoe
et al., supra note 81, at 137-39 (detailing relatively high frequency of facial lacerations and hand
injuries in MIVIA). See also Morrison, supra note 81, at 2475 (discussing relatively high frequency of
facial lacerations and hand injuries in boxing). Facial lacerations and hand injuries are not considered
serious because they pose little risk of long-term damage. Id.
84. Bledsoe et al., supra note 81, at 140.
85. See McCunney & Russo, supra note 80, at 57; Gonzales, sura note 80, at 1510.
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surrender before actually suffering a serious injury-resulting in decisive
victory without further damaging one's opponent. 86 Fourth, MMA fighters
are less likely than boxers or kickboxers to suffer extended beatings when
overmatched. A boxer or kickboxer has a ten-count to recover and may
accordingly survive the knockdown blow, but continue on to suffer several
rounds of additional punishment. 87 Since MMA gloves are smaller than
boxing gloves and there is no ten-count, 88 if an MJVJA fighter becomes
momentarily disoriented or knocked down after a blow, he is more likely to
lose the bout immediately than is a boxer or kickboxer.
The point, of course, is not that MMvIA is the safest sport in the country.
It is not. Rather, the point is that American society accepts (1) that sport in
general has value and combat sports have additional instrumental military and
self-defense value; (2) that virtually all sport and athletic activity pose risks,
which vary depending on the particular activity; and (3) that, accordingly, we
do not interfere with an individual's choice to engage in or watch a given
sport or activity unless it is so lacking in utility or so acutely dangerous that
society is simply unwilling to tolerate its practice. 89 Compared to the wide
range of sporting activity Americans accept as legitimate, MMA is not an
outlier on either utility or danger grounds.
2. No Skill
A second objection to MMA is that it involves little or no skill, that it is
simply talentless brawling that lacks the general utility of sport (which, by
definition, requires skill) and the specific utility of combat sport (which, by
definition, requires knowledge of particular offensive and defensive
techniques), and thus needlessly exposes its participants to danger. This
argument, essentially, treats MMA as equivalent to the imaginary game of
"head-falling." Head-falling is a contest between two men to see who can fall
from a higher distance onto a concrete floor on one's head without losing
consciousness. The falls begin low, at one foot, and then increase at six inch
intervals until one man is unconscious. Head-falling requires no skill. It's
86. Cf. Sam Caplan, Demian Maia: The Gentleman Black Belt, FIVEOUNCESOFPAIN.coM, Feb. 17,
2009, http://fiveouncesofpain.com/2009/02/17/demian-maia-the-gendeman-black-belt/ (quoting
top middleweight fighter Demian Maia as preferring, if possible, to win by submission "without a
scratch to me or my opponent").
87. See, e.g., NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 467.740 (2009).
88. See, e.g., id.
89. For example, gunfighting, i.e., consensual dueling, might have military or self-defense
utility, but is far too dangerous for society to permit. Indeed, there is little doubt that consensual
gunfighting-with real bullets, no protective gear, and to the death-might attract (1) talented risk-
seekers willing to risk death for the thrill of competition and financial reward, and (2) people eager to
watch it. Yet for an array of reasons (which we need not explore here) American society does not
normally condone or permit choices where death is certain or highly likely. MMA does not fall
within that category.
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simply a contest that exposes its participants to injury, and thus there is little
reason to consider it a legitimate activity to perform or watch.90
It is easy to see why the "no skill, only danger" objection may have
appeared valid in the early days of MMA. Many early competitors lacked
virtually anything appealing: skill, fitness, brains, or charisma. Today,
however, the claim that MMA does not require skill-that it is like the
imaginary game of head-falling-is demonstrably absurd. MA participants
include All-American and national champion wrestlers, national and world jiu-
jitsu champions, former pro boxers, and Olympic athletes. 91 Current UFC
welterweight champion Georges St. Pierre recently won Sportnet's Canadian
Athlete of the Year for the second year in a row, defeating NHL wunderkind
Sidney Crosby.92
3. Injurious Intent and Erosion of Norms
Another objection to MMA is that the sport is illegitimate because, unlike
other athletic competitions, harm toward one's opponent is intended, rather
than incidental. The concern is that condoning and promoting the intentional
injuring of other human beings fosters, among both participants and
spectators, a diminished concern for the health and well-being of others.
Normally, society has strong prohibitions against intentionally injuring others,
which are relaxed only in extreme circumstances, such as when one is acting
in defense of one's person, family, property, or country. Intentional harm, in
most other cases, is severely punished; here, the objection goes, it is glorified,
which, when exposed to a broad audience, could undermine empathy norms
and promote violent behavior.
The intent to harm in MMA is explicitly contingent upon the other
athlete's consent and constrained by clear rules. In other words, it is a sporting
intent to harm, to achieve victory in an agreed-upon circumstance, rather than
a malicious intent to harm the opponent. Intentional injury in combat
sport-and thus the violence to which observers are exposed-occurs
because the participants are voluntarily subjecting themselves to rule-governed
90. Cf. supra note 69 (explaining that I do not here assert a libertarian defense of consensual
activities as by definition legitimate because such an argument is unnecessary, given the compelling
pragmatic and comparative justifications of MMA's legitimacy).
91. See, e.g., Fighter Detail: Brock Lesnar, http://www.ufc.com/BrockLesnar (last visited Oct.
2, 2009) (explaining that UFC Heavyweight Champion Brock Lesnar is a former national collegiate
wrestling champion and a four-time All American); Fighter Detail: B. J. Penn, http://www.ufc.com/
BJPenn (last visited Oct. 2, 2009) (explaining that UFC Lightweight Champion B.J. Penn is a former
jiu-jitsu world champion); Fighter Detail: Marcus Davis, http://www.ufc.com/MarcusDavis (last
visited Oct. 2, 2009) (explaining that UFC welterweight Marcus Davis is a former professional
boxer); Fighter Detail: Dan Henderson, http://www.ufc.com/DanHenderson (explaining that UFC
middleweight Dan Henderson is a former Olympic wrestler).
92. Two in a Row for GSP as Canadian Athlete of the Year, http://www.ufc.com/
index.cfm?fa=news.detail&gid=32930 (last visited December 26, 2009).
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intentional harm under vey particular circumstances (e.g., a discrete bout
governed by a referee).
It is difficult to see how intentional harm committed in such explicitly
constrained and voluntary sporting circumstances threatens to erode
cooperative norms and encourage violent behavior. Moreover, if one were to
insist that MMA is illegitimate on those grounds, the argument would
encompass far more than just MMA. Under this argument, all other full-
contact sports would be swept up as illegitimate, almost certainly including
football, where the defensive object is toforceful!y ground your opponent. 93 In
addition, in comparative terms, MMA violence is far more contextually
constrained than are depictions of violence found elsewhere in modern
American life, such as in certain video games, action films, police dramas, war
documentaries, and a large portion of many newscasts. 94 Indeed, action
movies, violent video games, and war footage involve neither consenting
players nor clear contextual bounds on the appropriateness of harming others,
aside from vague notions that the recipients of the violence deserve it.95
These other examples of violence in American life impart a far more troubling
message about the propriety of intentional harm than a consensual rule-bound
contest between trained athletes overseen by a referee. Acceptance of large
swathes of the American sports, entertainment, and media landscape as
legitimate requires a similar acceptance of MMA.
4. Uninformed Choices
The last objection challenging MMA's legitimacy arises from the concern
that participants are making uninformed, irrational, or otherwise sub-optimal
choices in subjecting themselves to the risks associated with the activity.
Choice deficiencies are a real concern, but one partial cure is to require, by
regulation, that an expert's risk assessment-i.e., a physician's or regulatory
official's-be substituted for that of the participant's on matters regarding
whether the participant is capable or healthy enough to fight, to continue an
existing fight, or even to train. In many states, precisely such regulations
exist.96
93. See, e.g., Dean Richardson, Player Violence: An Essay on Torts and Sports, 15 STAN. L. & POL'Y
REV. 133, 134 (2004) (quoting former Oakland Raider Jack Tatum as saying his best hits "border on
felonious assault").
94. Cf Clay Calvert, The Two-Step Evidentiag and Causation Quandag for Medium-Spedfic Laws
Ta.eing Sexual and Violent Content: First Proting Harm and Injuy to Silence Speech, then Proing Redress and
Rehabilitation Through Censorsho, 60 FED. COMM. L.J. 157, 160-61 (2008) (citations omitted) (noting
broad prevalence of violent images on television, the Internet, and in movies).
95. Cf American Amusement Machine Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 579 (7th Cit. 2001)
("When Dirty Harry or some other avenging hero kills off a string of villains, the audience is
expected to identify with him, to revel in his success, to feel their own finger on the trigger.").
96. See infra Part IlI.A.
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Nonetheless, even the most optimistic proponents of regulation would
concede that regulation is unlikely to ensure optimal decision-making. Even
strong regulation may be unable to overcome cognitive biases97 that afflict the
young adult males who overwhelmingly constitute those interested in taking
up MMA, or to counterweigh financial incentives that might impel poor
young men to take physical risks they would not otherwise take.
A genuine concern about choice deficiencies should not rob us of
perspective. First, it should not be ignored that some participants may be
making a choice that seems unwise to third-party observers, but that actually
is consistent with the choice-maker's true preference. Second, the risk of
imperfect choices-e.g., choices made for short-term circumstantial reasons,
choices impaired by cognitive biases, or choices made absent necessary
information-are no more likely to occur in the MiMA context than in other
areas of life that may have greater, and possibly injurious consequences for
poor decision-makers. American tradition prizes individual choice, even
absent certainty that these choices are not in some way burdened by
circumstantial considerations, cognitive biases, or incomplete information.
Consumption choices of tobacco, alcohol, and fatty foods are an obvious
example. While those goods are regulated, American society at large accepts
their consumption, notwithstanding evidence that some players may very well
be choosing to smoke, drink, or eat donuts because of decisions based on
cognitive biases. Similarly, it is accepted that lower-income individuals may be
more likely to choose dangerous non-sporting occupations that they might
have avoided were they financially better off. It is unpersuasive to brand
MMA as illegitimate merely because the choice process may not be perfect.
Few choices are immune to that criticism.
IV. Regulating Mixed Martial Arts
Where present, MMA regulation is largely state-based. The various state
legislatures pass laws regulating IMA and commonly delegate authority to an
administrative body-often a state athletic commission/board-to perform
rule-making, licensing, operational, and enforcement functions. 98  MMA
97. Cognitive biases "are subconscious mental processes that impair rational thought-processes
and ultimately lead to 'irrational' choices." Michael A. McCann, It's Not About the Mony: The Role of
Preferences, Cognitive Biases, and Heuristics Among Professional Athletes, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1459, 1468
(2006). One example of a cognitive bias immediately relevant to MMA is "optimism bias," where
people assume they will be unusually successful in securing desirable outcomes and avoiding
unpleasant ones. Id. at 1471-72. See also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits
of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 217 (1995) ("[W]hen people rate their chances for personal and
professional success, most unrealistically believe that their chances are better than average.") (citation
omitted).
98. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18602.1 (West 2009) (discussing Athletic
Commission's "licensing, regulatory, and disciplinary functions"); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18640
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organizations, such as the UFC and smaller promoters, have their own
organizational regulations which, although they cannot conflict with state
regulations, may, within those bounds, differ between organizations. 99
Accordingly, the relevant regulations will vary depending on the state or tribal
land in which a contest occurs and the organization holding the bout.
Given the critical role regulation has played and will continue to play in
the development of MMA as a culturally legitimate athletic activity, a
conceptual organization of MMA's contemporary regulatory universe will be
useful for scholars, legislators, and reformers seeking to understand, research,
or reform the sport. To wit, a significant portion of current legislative,
administrative, and organizational regulation of MMA can be grouped into
three broad substantive categories: (1) rules addressing athlete safety; (2) rules
aimed at ensuring true and fairly-administered contests; and (3) rules
constraining or prohibiting certain undesirable relationships among the
various MMA players.100 This categorical architecture serves as a productive
schema to organize the myriad regulations that undergird and legitimize the
sport.
A. Athlete Safety
Although MMA is less dangerous than is commonly thought, the sport
obviously poses considerable physical risk to competing athletes.
Unsurprisingly, a significant portion of regulation targets combatant safety,
particularly (1) the MIMA rules of sport, (2) regulations banning performance
enhancing drugs, and (3) discretionary safeguards vested within regulators and
physicians.
1. Rules of Sport
Central among MA's safety regulations are the core "rules of sport" that
define the contours of MMA and distinguish it from anything-goes
brawling.'l ' The classic expression of MMA's rules of sport is New Jersey's
Mixed Martial Arts Uniform Rules of Conduct ("Uniform Rules" or "Unified
(West 2009) (the Athletic Commission has "sole direction, management, control of, and jurisdiction
over... all forms and combinations of forms of full contact martial arts contests, including mixed
martial arts, and matches or exhibitions conducted, held, or given within this state.").
99. For example, the UFC famously conducts all of its bouts in the "Octagon." See Part I.A.
supra. In contrast, other promotions may hold their bouts inside a ring.
100. The four categories of MMA player are set forth in Part I.B., supra.
101. In addition to the "rules of sport" discussed herein, states use other mandatory safety rules
to protect athlete health. See, e.g., NEV. ADmIN. CODE § 467.149 (2009) (requiring promoters to
provide health insurance that covers in-bout injury); id. § 467.414 (requiring ambulance and
emergency medical personnel to be on site for bouts); id. § 467.472 (requiring a minimum amount of
time between bouts for a given fighter); id. § 467.642 (requiring ringside physician be present during
bouts); and CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 18654 (requiring that a licensee report an injury or knockout
suffered by another licensee during training).
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Rules"). 10 2 The Unified Rules owe their provenance to an April 3, 2001,
meeting organized by the New Jersey State Athletic Control Board
("NJSACB"). 103 On that day, the NJSACB convened a meeting of MMA
regulators and other players interested in formalizing bout rules. 104 Based on
that lengthy meeting, as well as the NJSACB's prior study of MMA, the
NJSACB promulgated the Unified Rules, the latest version of which are in
effect in New Jersey today.'05 States with significant MMA activity such as
Nevada, California, and Ohio have adopted near-identical rules of sport. 106
The Unified Rules address a wide variety of bout characteristics, such as:
maneuvers prohibited because they are exceptionally dangerous and thought
to require little skill (e.g., biting, eye-gouging, and groin-strikes), equipment
standards (e.g., groin protectors, gloves, mouthpieces), weight classes, round
length, rest time between rounds, and total rounds in a contest, and the ability
of referee or ringside physician to stop a fight.107 The obvious rationale for
102. N.J. ADMIN. CODE §§ 13:46-24A.1-13:46-24B.5 (2009).
103. See New Jersey State Athletic Control Board, Mixed Martial Arts Unified Rules of Conduct,
Additional Mixed Martial Arts Rules, Summary of agency proposal, http://wvw.state.nj.us/
lps/sacb/docs/martial.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2010).
104. E-mail from Nick Lembo, Counsel to the New Jersey State Athletic Control Board, to
author (Sept. 28, 2009, 08:30 CST) (on file with author) (setting forth attendees and their affiliations).
105. See, e.g., N.J. ADMIN. CODE S 13:46-24A.1 (2009) (weight classes); § 13:46-24A.2 (fighting
area requirements); § 13:46-24A.3 (stools for seconds within fighting area); 5 13:46-24A.4 (water
bucket and water bottle must be provided); 5 13:46-24A.5 (hand wrap requirements); § 13:46-24A.6
(mandatory mouthpiece); § 13:46-24A.7 (groin protection for men, chest protection for women); 5
13:46-24A.8 (gloves mandatory and must be approved by Commission); § 13:46-24A.9 (mandatory or
prohibited apparel); § 13:46-24A.10 (physical appearance); § 13:46-24A.11 (round and bout lengths);
§ 13:46-24A.12 (referee and ringside physician may stop bout); § 13:46-24A.13 judging criteria); §
13:46-24A.14 (referee warning for specified infraction); § 13:46-24A.15 (fouls); § 13:46-24A.16
(consequence of injury during bout); § 13:46-24A.17 (possible bout outcomes).
Strictly speaking, the term "Uniform Rules" originally referred to the entirety of the original
subchapter 24A of the New Jersey Administrative Code, which set forth "the rules that were
universally agreed upon" at the April 3, 2001 meeting described in the text. See New Jersey State
Athletic Control Board, supra note 103 (describing proposed subchapter 24A). Today, the terms
"uniform rules" or "unified rules" are often informally used as a reference to the list of prohibited
maneuvers in an MMA bout, which today is reflected in N.J. ADMIN. CODE 5 13:46-24A.1 5 (2009).
106. See e.g., NEV. ADMIN. CODE §§ 467.795-7968 (2009) (setting forth MMA-specific Nevada
regulations); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 4, §§ 500-546 (2009); OHIO ADMIN. CODE §§ 3773:7-01-3773:7-
22 (2009). Interestingly, "the Ohio Athletic Commission regulates more MMA events per year than
any other commissionn, including those in Nevada and California, thanks to the state's rapidly
growing iLNMA fan base." John Morgan & Dann Stupp, Hang On Sloopy: WEC Could Take UFC's
March Slot in Columbus, Ohio, MMAJUNKIE, Sept. 18, 2009, http://mmajunkie.com/news/
16236/hang-on-sloopy-wec-could-take-ufcs-march-slot-in-columbus-ohio.mma.
107. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:46-24A.1 5(a) (2009). The list of maneuvers prohibited by New
Jersey (and essentially mirrored in other states with significant MMA activity) is quite long:
(a) The following are fouls and will result in penalties if committed:
1. Butting with the head;
2. Eye gouging of any kind;
3. Biting or spitting at an opponent;
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such rules is that they protect athlete safety while still permitting skillful and
dramatic contests.
2. Drug Prohibitions
Regulations prohibiting the use of performance-enhancing drugs ("PED")
by MiMA competitors are also safety rules of fundamental importance.10s
PEDs are dangerous to the user and to the user's opponent, particularly in
combat sports. The opponent's risk when competing against a physically
enhanced adversary is two-fold: He faces (1) a heightened risk of injury and
(2) a heightened risk of defeat. Accordingly, MMA athletes wishing to remain
competitive with PED-using peers will need to use PEDs themselves, with
the attendant costs. The irony is that if everyone uses PEDs then no
advantage is gained, but all bear the costs of use: both in long-term
deteriorative effects and the short term cost of additional in-ring injuries
inflicted by chemically enhanced fighters. Widespread PED use is also likely
to undermine public confidence and reduce willingness to follow the sport.109
Obviously, an anti-PED rule on the books is not enough; it must be
rigorously enforced. The strength of enforcement is largely based on the
discretion of state commission officials, and, regrettably, varies from state to
state. 110
4. Hair pulling;
5. Fish hooking;
6. Groin attacks of any kind;
7. Intentionally placing a finger in any opponent's orifice;
8. Downward pointing of elbow strikes;
9. Small joint manipulation;
10. Strikes to the spine or back of the head;
11. Heel kicks to the kidney;
12. Throat strikes of any kind;
13. Clawing, pinching, twisting the flesh or grabbing the clavicle;
14. Kicking the head of a grounded fighter;
15. Kneeing the head of a grounded fighter;
16. Stomping of a grounded fighter;
25. Spiking an opponent to the canvas on his or her head or neck.
108. See, e.g., NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 467.850 (2009) (prohibition of use of certain drugs by bout
participant); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 4, § 303 (2009).
109. See Thomas H. Murray, The Ethics of Drugs in Sports, in DRUGS AND PERFORMANCE IN
SPORTS 11, 15 (Richard H. Strauss, ed. 1987) ("[PEDs] should be banned because they do not reflect
the forms of human excellence that sports are intended to honor.").
110. Compare CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 4, § 303(b) (2009) (requiring testing, but vesting discretion
with commission representative as to when drug test occurs) with NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 467.850(5)
(2009) (test of athlete occurs "if the commission or the commission's representative directs him to do
so.") and 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 61.30(p) (2009) ("Executive Director may order a drug screen at
any time for good cause."). In a UFC event recently held in Texas, Texas regulators tested no
athletes because there was no "good cause" to do so. Steve Sievert, UFC Requests Drug Testing for
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3. Discrefionagy Safeguards
Although the application of virtually all rules in some sense depends on
the discretion of those charged with enforcement, there is an important group
of MMA safety regulations that are discretionary in a very particular way: they
substitute the judgment of an expert actor for that of the fighter, regarding the
fighter's fitness for participation in MMA activity. Such discretionary
regulatory power is commonly vested in the athletic commission itself or in
physicians working in furtherance of applicable legislative or administrative
rules.
In California, the athletic commission has broad discretionary powers
over all MMA events. California has declared that "[n]o event shall take place
without the prior approval of the commission."'' In addition to the
commission's plenary discretion regarding event approval, all MMA fighters
must obtain a license to fight.11 2 In making its licensure decision, the
commission considers the applicant's "ability to perform" as well as the
"totality of the person's physical condition."11 3  California's athletic
commission also relies heavily on the judgment of physicians, requiring that
fighters pass medical examinations both to obtain a license and in advance of
given bouts. 114 The self-evident aim of these discretionary safeguards is to
prevent unskilled or medically at-risk athletes from competing in the first
place. California has further discretionary safeguards regarding in-competition
and post-competition conduct: Physicians can stop bouts for medical reasons,
and athletes are subject to post-bout medical examinations and suspension
from training and fighting depending on the severity of injury suffered." 5
UFC 103, Despite Lack of Requirement In Texas, MMAJUNKIE, Sept. 17, 2009, http://mmajunkie.com/
news/I 6205/ufc-requests-drug-testing- for-ufc-103-despite-lack-of-requirement-in-texas.mma.
111. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 18640 (West 2009).
112. Id. ("No person shall engage in the promotion of, or participate in, a boxing or martial arts
contest, match, or exhibition without a license, and except in accordance with this chapter and the
rules adopted hereunder.'. See also CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18642 (West 2009) (license from the
commission required for MMA participation).
113. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18642.5 (West 2009) (an MMA "fighter shall, prior to licensure
by the commission, demonstrate his or her ability to perform [and if] at any time a ... fighter's ability
to perform is questionable the commission shall revalidate the licensee using standards adopted in
regulation by the commission.'). See also CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 4, § 281(a) (2009) (licensure
evaluation takes into account "totality of the person's physical condition," including age, injuries, and
record, and flatly denies licensing to an individual "who has suffered cerebral hemorrhage or any
other serious head injury"). Although section 281(a) uses the term "boxer," unless otherwise
specified "all of the professional boxing rules apply to martial arts contests or matches .... CAL.
CODE REGS. tit. 4, § 502 (2009).
114. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 18706 (West 2009) (pre-bout medical examination); § 18711
(medical examinations for licensing and renewal).
115. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 4, § 308 (2009) (medical suspensions).
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Although varying in substance and vigor of application, similar sets of
discretionary regulations exist in other states that regulate MMVA. 116
B. True and Fairly Administered Contests
A second conceptual grouping of regulations important to MMA's
sporting legitimacy is those intended to ensure the integrity of MMA bouts.
Specifically, these regulations serve to make sure that MMA bouts are (1) true,
rather than sham, contests and (2) fairly-administered contests. A true contest
is one where both competitors are exerting genuine effort to win. A fairly
administered contest is one where the referee and judges are both
knowledgeable and impartial. Disappointingly, sports history has seen its fair
share of sham or unfairly administered matches. 117
1. True Contests
As a preliminary matter, there are two ways in which a contest can be a
sham, and thus two things responsive regulations could address. The first way
in which a contest can be a sham is if both participants agree on the outcome
in advance; i.e, they collaborate, rather than compete. Such is the case in
professional wrestling, where a jointly predetermined match is called a
"work."" 8 The second way a contest can be a sham is when the contest is
"thrown;" i.e., one participant enters the match with the intent to deliberately
lose or to keep the match closer than it would have been for some financial
benefit. The most famous example of a thrown sporting event is the 1919
World Series. 119
Both worked and thrown matches are, at best, entertainment, not sport,
and permitting athletes to collectively or unilaterally determine contest
outcomes poses a fatal threat to MMA's sporting legitimacy. 120 All sporting
audiences expect honest displays of skill, not theater or fraud. Tolerance of
116. See, e.g., OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3773:7-02 (2009) (commission's broad scope of authority);
§ 3773:7-16 (licensing); § 3773:7-21 (medical licensing requirements); § 3773:7-19 (medical
suspensions).
117. See, e.g., ANDREW JENNINGS, THE NEW LORDS OF THE RINGS: OLYNIPIC CORRUPTION
AND HOW TO BUY MEDALS 79-92 (1996) (discussing corruption during 1988 Olympics); DECLAN
HILL, THE FIX: SOCCER AND ORGANIZED CRIME (2008) (fixing of soccer matches); Richard H.
McLaren, Comption: Its Impact on Fair Play, 19 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 15, 29 (2008) (discussing NBA
referee betting scandal).
118. "Worked" matches may very well be entertaining-indeed, that was why, early in the
twentieth century, legitimately skilled wrestlers began to collaborate on outcomes, rather than contest
them. See BEEKMAN, supra note 24, at 38-41. But such is not sport.
119. See general# ELIOT ASINOF, EIGHT MEN OUT: THE BLACK SOX AND THE 1919 WORLD
SERIES (1963).
120. See, McLaren, supra note 117, at 15 (arguing that match fixing and biased refereeing make
sport entertainment, not sport, and therefore "gnaws away at the fundamental foundations of sport
and therefore of sporting integrity").
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sham contests also drives away those viewers who prefer to make wagers on
their sport of choice. Where the betting public has little confidence that the
contests are genuine, betting will evaporate, and ticket-buyers and event-
watchers enticed to watch to see the outcome of their wager will be lost.
Sham contests in MMA are discouraged by laws of general applicability
against throwing or fixing any sporting event for financial gain, as well as
regulations promulgated by state athletic commissions requiring that athletes
give honest effort in contests in which they participate. 121 Ohio goes so far as
to explicitly reserve the right to refuse to license fighters or promoters who
associate with gamblers or criminals. 122 In addition, athletic commissions are
frequently given broad power to protect the best interests of the sport and,
accordingly, to discipline or ban individuals involved in sham contests. 123
2. Fairly Administered Contests
Credible and impartial bout officials-e.g., referees, judges, and ringside
physicians-are critical to MMA's legitimacy. Audiences are unlikely to
embrace a sport which does not routinely provide knowledgeable and
impartial contest administration. Because combat sports, particularly
boxing, 124 have been historically rife with instances of untrained, inept, or
outright corrupt officiating or judging, regulation designed to prevent such
conduct in MLMA is crucial to long-term acceptance of the sport. In addition,
fair and competent officiating in MMA is especially important because
negligent or fraudulent officiating can result in serious injury to competitors.
Impartial officiating is obviously of foundational importance. As when
participants engage in a worked fight, referees or judges fixing fights
constitutes sporting disaster, rendering a match a charade rather than a
contest. Of course, corruption in officiating can be more subtle than betting
on fights or taking bribes; a licensed official might have an informal
relationship with a promoter, manager, or fighter, and thus quietly put a
121. See, e.g., NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 467.723 (2009) (participant not honestly competing may be
disqualified and have his purse held by the Commission pending investigation); § 875 (failure to
report to Commission that a licensee has been approached with a suggestion that a contest not be
conducted honestly is grounds for disciplinary action). See also CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE 5 18860
(West 2009) (fighter purse can be withheld should it "appear that such contestant is not competing
honestly").
122. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3773:1-09(B)-(C) (2009). See also NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 467.885(6)
(2009) (consorting with felons, gamblers and "reputed underworld character[s]" grounds for license
denial or suspension).
123. See, e.g., NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 467.885(6)( 0 (2009) (Commission may discipline for any
conduct "that is detrimental to the best interests of unarmed combat').
124. See Gary Smith, One Tough Bird, Sports Illustrated, June 26, 1995, available at http://
vault.sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1006753/l/index.htm (judges banned
in the aftermath of highly suspect decision loss for American boxer Roy Jones Jr. at the 1988
Olympics).
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thumb on the scale when officiating a given bout. To protect against
corruption, states usually give the athletic commission the sole authority to
select a bout's officials. 125
Competent officiating is also crucial, and because MMA is a fairly new
sport, the country does not abound with knowledgeable officials. 126 Although
many states require officials to be licensed, stronger regulation may be
warranted to ensure more MMA officials are truly competent. For example,
the Association of Boxing Commissions ("ABC") is an advisory group of
state athletic commission representatives from different states that recently
established an MMA sub-group ("ABC-MMA"). 127 During its July 30, 2009,
meeting, the ABC-MMA proposed that it certify MMA referee/judge training
courses, so that individual state commissions could have reliable evidence that
applicants had relevant and high-quality training prior to granting a license. 128
The ABC-MMA committee also recommended that commissions conduct
post-event review and regular training of licensed officials. 129 Although the
ABC-MMA's recommendations are not binding, they carry persuasive weight.
C. Restriction of Relationships
A third important conceptual grouping of regulation relates to rules
governing permissible relationships and deal terms among the various MMA
players. Presently, IMA relationship regulation primarily focuses on (1)
preventing conflicts of interest and (2) enforcing bargained-for arrangements.
Limits on the content of deals struck between the various players are the
subject of far weaker regulation.
1. Conflicts of Interest
As discussed in Part I.B., supra, a primary concern regarding regulators is
that they will be subtly biased in favor of some of the players they are charged
with regulating. Of particular concern is the "revolving door" problem,
namely, that regulators will come from the private sector and, after their
125. See, e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 4, § 370 (2009) (commission shall select referee).
126. Josh Gross, For MA4A Officials, Anonymiy Means a Job Well Done, SI.COM, Mar. 27, 2009,
http://sportsifustrated.cnn.com/2009/writers/josh-gross/03/26/referees/index.htm ("California
has 20 reflerees] dedicated full-time to MMA; Ohio, close to 15; Nevada, seven.").
127. Dann Stupp, NAC's Nick Lembo to Head ABC's New MMA Committee, MMAJUNKIE, July
15, 2008, http://mmajunkie.com/news/4808/njacs-nick-lembo-to-head-abcs-new-
mmacommittee.mma (discussing formation of ABC committee focusing on MMA).
128. NICK LEMBO, ET AL., SUMMARY REPORT: DISCUSSION AND REVIEW OF UNIFIED RULES
OF MIXED MARTIAL ARTS, (2009), http://www.abcboxing.com/unified_mma_rules.htrnl (last
visited Jan. 22, 2010) (discussing ABC committee findings regarding training for referees and judges).
129. Id.
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tenure of public service, return there. 130 The fear is that regulators may
strategically discharge their duties in a way that is not always in the best
interest of the sport, but rather in the best interest of the regulator's past or
future private employer, whether it be a promoter, manager, or fighter. To
address this concern, states such as California have limited eligibility for a seat
on the state athletic commission to people who have not been licensed in the
previous two years. 131 Prohibitions against an immediate transition into the
private sector after regulatory service is concluded would be a further
safeguard against undesirable influence.
Regarding conflicts of interest in the manager and promoter context,
managers are expected to negotiate on behalf of the fighter to secure the most
lucrative possible engagement terms from the promoter. To the extent that a
promoter and a manager share interests, the fighter's interest will be put at
risk. Accordingly, existing regulation imposes significant restraints on
arrangements between promoters and managers, including prohibiting a
promoter from acting as a manager or owning an interest in a manager's or
fighter's earnings, and barring assignment of a manager's fees to a
promoter.132
2. Promoting Deal Enforcement
Other MMA relationship regulation aims to ensure contract performance.
For example, to discourage breach of managerial deals with fighters, Nevada
requires that the managerial contract be filed with the Commission prior to a
given bout.1 33 These regulations protect against post-bout deal modification
that might occur if deals were oral or if the contract was not filed. Regarding
promoters, Nevada requires that a "bout agreement"-on a form set forth by
the NSAC-be filed, and that in advance of the bout the promoter "deliver to
130. See, e.g., Christopher N. Camponovo, Indecent Proposal: Abraham Sofaer, Libya and the
Appearance ofImpropriy, 21 J. LEGAL PROF. 23, 27-28 (1997) (discussing four manifestations of the
"revolving door" concern). This is not to say that there are not benefits of personnel traffic between
the public and private sectors, there are. See Edna Earle Vass Johnson, Ageny "Capture": The
'Revolving Door" Between Regulated Industries and Their Regulating Agencies, 18 U. RICH. L. REV. 95, 97-99
(1983) (identifying positives and negatives of public-private personnel movement). But an
appropriate balance must be struck.
131. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18602 (2009) (no person licensed in the last two years
can serve on the Commission).
132. See, e.g., NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 467.102 (2009) (no assignment without Commission
approval); § 467.104 (promoter cannot act as manager or have interest in manager or fighter's
earnings); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18848 (2009) (promoter who manages fighter without
Commission approval is subject to discipline), § 18849 (promoter cannot have "proprietary interest"
in fighter "competing on the premises owned, leased, or rented by the promoter" without
Commission approval).
133. NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 467.102 (2009) (managerial contract must be filed). Cf CAL. BUS.
& PROF. CODE S 18852 (2009) (manager must keep "documentation" regarding fighter payments for
five years).
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the Commission, checks, letters of credit or another method of payment that
is approved by the Commission for distribution to the entitled persons."' 134
The aim of such provisions is to ensure fighters get the money they were
promised. Yet such regulations have limited force, because fighters and
promoters may be bound by a number of agreements other than a bout
agreement.135
3. Deal Content
While there is some regulation concerning the content of deals between
promoters and fighters (such as Nevada's bout agreement requirement), and
between managers and fighters (such as restrictions on the length of a
managerial contract and a limit on contingent pay),136 outside of conflict of
interest limitations, deal content is largely determined by player bargaining.
Whether this is a salutary regulatory position is open for debate. In boxing,
for example, fighters have long been believed to face considerable bargaining
disadvantages, causing some to urge legislative or regulatory limits on deal
content that provides boxers with substantive protections or specialized
remedies. 137  No "shovel-ready" solutions present themselves for those
desirous of providing deal-content protections to MMA fighters, although
two possibilities that deserve further study are federalization and unionization,
highlighted in Part IV below.
D. Regulation in Action: "Greasegate"
MMA regulation has proven to be a lively area; each year, several
regulatory stories capture the attention of the MMA community. One of
2009's most contentious regulatory matters was a bitter episode concerning an
errant dollop of petroleum jelly. "Greasegate," as it was popularly called, 138
demonstrates the seriousness with which MMA players view regulation and
illustrates the degree to which contemporary MMA has evolved from its early
1990s ancestor.
On January 31, 2009, the day before Super Bowl XLIII, welterweight
champion Georges St. Pierre defended his welterweight title against
lightweight champion B. J. Penn in Las Vegas, Nevada. The fight, a rematch,
134. NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 467.112 (2009) (bout agreement); § 467.142(2) (pre-paid
requirement).
135. See Wimsett, supra note 60 (explaining the various contracts promoters and fighters may
enter into).
136. See, e.g., NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 467.102 (2009) (managerial contract cannot be longer than
four years, and cannot award more than 3 3 .3 % of fighter's purses to manager).
137. See Part IV.A., infra.
138. See, e.g., Andy Samuelson, 'Grease-Gate' Sjilla Sl/ppegy Subject, LAS VEGAS SUN, Mar. 17, 2009,
available at htrp://www.lasvegassun.com/news/20 09/mar/17/grease-gate-stifl-slippery-after-hearing/
[hereinafter Samuelson, Sfippery Subject].
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was the product of enormous hype: Both Penn and St. Pierre were believed to
be among the best "pound-for-pound" fighters in the world. 39 They were
both current world champions, and their first fight was extremely close.' 40 As
it were, the match proved a bit of letdown. St. Pierre had improved since the
first fight and exploited his superior size and strength to take Penn down
repeatedly and manhandle him. 41 After four rounds of being dominated,
Penn failed to answer affirmatively when his corner asked if he wished to
continue the fight. 142 The ringside doctor, with Penn's corner men in
agreement, sensibly stopped the fight. 143
Post-fight controversy arose because it was alleged that, during the fight,
St. Pierre's corner man Phil Nurse had applied Vaseline® to St. Pierre's body
inappropriately.144 Vaseline® is used as a protectant and coagulant on the
face of boxers and MMA fighters, but because MMA incorporates grappling
and jiu-jitsu, Vaseline® on the body can constitute an advantage by making
the "greased" fighter more slippery and thus less susceptible to submission
holds. The allegation was that after applying Vaseline® to St. Pierre's face,
corner man Nurse did not adequately clean his hands before rubbing down St.
Pierre's neck and upper torso, thus applying Vaseline® to St. Pierre's body. 145
Penn is a world-class jiu-jitsu artist, and concern arose that the Vaseline® had
rendered Penn unable to utilize defensive and offensive jiu-jitsu against St.
Pierre, thus explaining, for Penn and his fans, the ease with which St. Pierre
controlled and damaged Penn during the ground portions of the fight. 146
As obscure as such a complaint seems to the uninitiated, there was, in
fact, a Nevada regulation directly on point concerning the use of "grease,"
which provides in pertinent part that "[t]he excessive use of grease or any
other foreign substance may not be used on the face or body of an unarmed
combatant. The referees or the Commission's representative in charge shall
139. David Meltzer, Is St. Pierre the New Poundfor-Pound Kng?, YAHOO! SPORTS, Feb. 1, 2009,
http://ca.sports.yahoo.com/mma/news?slug=dm-gsp020109&prov=yhoo&type=Igns.
140. See, e.g., Jeff Haney, Hype Is FerventAbead of Rematcb, LAS VEGAS SUN, Jan. 24, 2009, available
at http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2009/jan/24/hype-fervent-ahead-rematch/.
141. See, e.g., Sergio Non, St-Pierre Crushes Penn to Retain Welteneight Title at UFC 94, USA TODAY,
Feb. 2, 2009, available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/mma/2009-02-01-ufc94_N.htm.
142. Josh Gross, St. Pierre Floors Penn in 4tb at UFC 94, SICOM, Jan. 31, 2010, available at
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2009/writers/josh__gross/01/31/stpierre. penn.blog/.
143. See Non, supra note 141.
144. See Samuelson, Skppey Subject, supra note 138.
145. See, e.g., Andy Samuelson, 'Grease-Gate' Clouds Supe6ght, LAS VEGAS SUN, Feb. 3, 2009,
available at http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2009/feb/03/grease-gate-clouds-st-pierres-
dominant-win/ [hereinafter Samuelson, Superfigbt]. See also Samuelson, Slppey Subject, note 138.
146. See, e.g., Andy Samuelson, Penn's Camp Asks for Review in VaselineAllegation, LAS VEGAS SUN,
Feb. 4, 2009, available at http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2009/feb/04/penns-camp-asks-nsac-
review-vaseline-allegation/.
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cause any excessive grease or foreign substance to be removed."1 47 Once
aware that St. Pierre's corner men appeared to be applying some indefinite
amount of Vaseline® to St. Pierre's torso, state officials used a towel to wipe
down St. Pierre in between rounds to remove any possible Vaseline® on his
body. 148
Penn was unpersuaded that the officials' in-bout action was sufficient.
He complained in writing to the NSAC, claiming that St. Pierre and his corner
men had intentionally violated the rules, affected the outcome of the match,
and that the fight should be declared a "no contest." 149  The Commission
declined to take any action against St. Pierre or his corner men, presumably
believing that, lacking any further information, the actions of St. Pierre's
corner men neither changed the outcome of the contest nor constituted
"excessive" grease.15 0 Although the specific St. Pierre-Penn match result was
not changed, the controversy did result in a review and change of the existing
"grease" rule by the NSAC. On August 19, 2009, the NSAC voted to amend
the Nevada Administrative Code to make it a foul to "[a]pplyn any foreign
substance to the hair or body that could result in an advantage."''
The "Greasegate" episode is noteworthy because it highlights the many
ways in which MIA has matured since its vulgar beginnings. The bout that
gave rise to the controversy involved two enormously skilled professional
athletes, and it was stopped because one competitor had no hope of winning.
The controversy involved a very specific rule that resulted from careful
thought about ensuring fair bouts. Ringside observers were familiar with the
rule, and state regulatory officials leapt into action upon being informed of a
possible rules violation. The losing competitor then filed papers with a
regulatory body seeking relief, which was denied, but after the NSAC
conducted a review of the rule in question, it was ultimately changed. This is
147. NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 467.598(2) (2009).
148. See Samuelson, Superfight, supra note 145.
149. See, e.g., Tom Hamliin, Penn Files Formal Complaint witb NSAC, MMAWEEKLY, Mar. 11,
2009, http://www.mmaweekly.com/absolutenm/templates/dailynews.asp?articleid=8357.
150. See, e.g., Tom Hamliin, No Penalties, But GSP vs Penn May Spur Change, MMAWEEKLY, Mar.
17, 2009, http://www.mmaweekly.com/absolutenm/templates/dailynews.asp?articleid=8406&
zoneid=13. Few observers believe any errant grease changed the fight outcome, and even fewer
believe St. Pierre intentionally broke any rule. Importantly, I want to make clear I am not criticizing
Mr. St. Pierre, Mr. Penn, or the NSAC regarding the episode.
151. E-mail from Keith Kizer, Executive Director, Nevada State Athletic Commission, to
author (Sept. 28, 2009, 08:45 CST) (on file with author). The amendment takes effect October 27,
2009. Id. See also Adopted Regulation of the Nevada Athletic Commission of the Department of
Business and Industry, LCB File No. R003-09, http://www.leg.state.nv.us/register/
2009Register/R003-09A.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2010) (adopting new regulation NEV. ADMIN.
CODE § 467.7962(32)); Steven Marrocco, The B3.J. Penn Rule' Instituted in Nevada, MMAWEEKLY, Aug.
19, 2009, http://www.mmaweekly.com/absolutenm/templates/dailynews.asp?Aricleid= 9411 &
zoneid=3 (describing new rule as the "B.J. Penn" rule).
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a far cry indeed from the first UFC bout, in which Gerard Gordeau kicked
Teila Tuli in the face, got some of Tuli's teeth stuck in his foot, and shocked
the stunned referee into stopping the fight even though the referee lacked
stoppage power at UFC 1.152 No one longs for that past.
V. Reform Horizons
Flourishing within a cradle of sensible regulation, MIA is rapidly
becoming an accepted part of the American sporting landscape. However,
the sport, and particularly the legal and regulatory regime it exists in, is far
from mature. Continued evolution is to be expected. Below, this article
briefly highlights two potential changes to MMA's landscape that are likely to
receive future attention by reformers and students of the sport, namely (1)
federalization and (2) unionization.
A. Federalization
The comparatively strict regulations in states like California and New
Jersey are not present in all states. For example, some states require far less
searching medical examinations to obtain or keep a fighter license than do
other states. 153 Strict regulation, by definition, will operate to prevent some
bouts from ever occurring within the state's borders, consequently resulting in
a loss of revenue for promoters, managers, and fighters, as well as a loss of
taxes for the state. This creates a potential "race to the bottom" scenario that
threatens maximum effectiveness of otherwise sound regulation. Promoters
and fighters, in pursuit of a payday, have an incentive to conduct bouts in
states where regulation is more lax, and thus, states have a financial incentive
to be less strict than their neighbors.
One possible solution is federal regulation. The rationale is that federal
regulation and enforcement would provide uniform, national standards and
limit the degree to which MMA players could cross state borders to avoid
salutary regulation. The problem is well known in boxing, where a
federalization approach has been tried with mixed results. 154
152. See WERTHEIM, supra note 17, at 58-59 (discussing the Tuli-Gordeau bout).
153. For example, California's medical licensing requirements are more demanding than those of
Kentucky. Compare CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 18711 (2009) (medical examinations for licensing
and renewal include "a neuro-psychological examination, a brain imaging scan, and an
electrocardiogram (EKG)") with KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 229.111 (2009) (general requirement of
medical examination) and 201 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 27:016 (2009) ("[p]articipants shall apply for
license onsite after prefight physicals ...."). Cf Melissa Neiman, Protecting Professional Boxers: Federal
Regulations with More Punch, 15 SPORTS LAW. J. 59, 81 (2008) (noting forum shopping by boxers
precluded for medical reasons from boxing in a given state).
154. See John McCain & Ken Nahigian, A Fighting Chance for Professional Boxing, 15 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REV. 7, 16 (2004) (describing, in the boxing context, the regulatory deficit when industry
players take advantage of disparate regulation between states).
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The two relevant pieces of federal boxing legislation are the Professional
Boxing Safety Act ("PBSA") and the Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act
("Ali Act"). 155 The PBSA was intended "to improve and expand the system
of safety precautions that protects"' 156 boxers, which it accomplished by: (1)
requiring that states honor medical suspensions of other states, 157 (2) requiring
that all boxing matches be overseen by a state, or joint-state, commission; 158
(3) requiring that a pre-fight medical examination by a physician certifying that
a boxer is "physically fit to safely compete" occur,159 and (4) requiring the
continuous ringside presence of a licensed physician and an ambulance. 160
The Ali Act, an amendment to the PBSA enacted in 2000, was intended to
protect the economic interest of boxers by banning certain "coercive
contracts" between promoters and boxers and by creating conflict of interest
"firewall[s]" between regulatory personnel, promoters, and managers. 161
Although the Ali Act also called for the Association of Boxing Commissions
to develop "minimum contractual provisions [to] be included in bout
agreements and boxing contracts," it did not make such "minimum
contractual provisions" mandatory. 62
Knowledgeable boxing observers have contended that existing federal
boxing legislation has, in practice, been mildly positive, but mostly ineffective.
A key criticism is that the legislation vests too much discretion in the
individual state commissions to interpret and apply the new (and not terribly
strong) federal protections. 63 State regulatory officials have exercised this
discretion unwisely, leaving uncured the race-to-the-bottom problem. 164 Such
155. The latter, passed in 2000, amended the former, passed in 1996. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6313
(2006).
156. 15 U.S.C. § 6302(1) (2006).
157. 15 U.S.C. § 6306 (2006).
158. 15 U.S.C. § 6303 (2006). States that lack commissions can have matches overseen by
another state's commission, or, if no other state commission can serve that purpose, by an
"association of boxing commissions" to which a majority of states belong. Id.
159. 15 U.S.C. § 6304(1) (2006).
160. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6304(2)-(3).
161. 15 U.S.C. § 6307b (2006) (protection against "coercive contracts"); § 6308 (conflict of
interest "firewall[s]"). See also McCain & Nahigian, supra note 154, at 20 (explaining that the "Ali Act
was designed to protect professional boxers from the often egregious and onerous business practices
of the industry.').
162. The Act provides simply that "[i]t is the sense of the Congress that State boxing
commissions should follow these ABC guidelines." 15 U.S.C. § 6307(a) (2006). Although the ABC
consists of representatives of all the state boxing commissions, it is a non-profit advisory group with
no regulatory authority.
163. 15 U.S.C. § 6307(a). Senator McCain himself has written that "federal, state, and tribal
enforcement of the PBSA and the Ali Act remain woefully inadequate." McCain & Nahigian, supra
note 154, at 22.
164. McCain & Nahigian, supra note 154, at 22. See also Michael J. Jurek, Note, Janitor or Savior:
The Role of Congress in Professional Boxing Reform, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1187, 1202 (2006) (criticizing federal
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criticism has prompted calls for the creation of a federal regulatory boxing
authority with broad rule-making and enforcement powers. 65 To date, no
such reform proposals have become law.
While the checkered success of the partial federalization of boxing should
serve as a lesson for MMA reform advocates, it does not mean federal
regulation cannot play a role in MMA's continuing evolution. Certainly the
appeal of a federalization proposal depends upon the details and attendant
political realities. However, we are in an era where federal regulation-the
lack of which is significantly blamed by many for creating the current
economic crisis166-may be more appealing and likely than it was a half-
decade ago. The question of federal MMA regulation deserves, and will
undoubtedly receive, further examination.
B. Unionization
Existing state regulation does little to regulate the terms of the deals
between promoters, managers, and fighters. While some regulation exists, 167
deal terms are largely the result of market bargaining between parties subject
to background law generally applicable to contracts. Like laborers elsewhere,
MMA athletes face significant bargaining disadvantages, relative to promoters,
in terms of financial and legal resources, education, and alternative
employment. Unfair or even exploitative arrangements are likely to result, and
concerns about low compensation and onerous contractual obligations are
beginning to gain traction with many MMA observers. 168 These concerns are
unsurprising. As Erwin Krasnow and Herman Levy wrote in the GeoTgetown
Law Journal almost fifty years ago, "reliance on owner benevolence is a rather
tenuous solution" to addressing inequitable treatment of athletes. 169 Given its
boxing legislation because "states are left to enforce the terms of the law" and they have done a poor
job of doing so).
165. For example, in 2002 Senator McCain proposed the "Professional Boxing Amendments
Act," which would have created the United States Boxing Association; i.e., a federal regulatory body
for boxing. See McCain & Nahigian, supra note 154, at 30 (discussing the proposed Act). The bill did
not become law, and subsequent efforts of Senator McCain to expand federal regulation of boxing
have been unsuccessful.
166. See, e.g., Roger Altman, Modern History's Greatest Regulatoy Failure, FIN. TIMES (London),
Sept. 17, 2008, at 15 (attributing America's financial meltdown to "the greatest regulatory failure in
modern history."); Francis Fukuyama, The Fall of Ameica, Inc., NEWSWEEK, Oct. 4, 2008, at 29
("Washington failed to adequately regulate the financial sector and allowed it to do tremendous harm
to the rest of the society.").
167. See Part Il.C, supra.
168. See, e.g., Kelsey Philpott, The Champion's Clause.- An MMA Comparaire, MIAPAYOUT.COM,
Sept. 7, 2009, http://mmapayout.com/2009/09/the-champions-clause-an-mma-comparative/
(comparing clauses binding champion fighters to their current promotion).
169. Erwin Krasnow & Herman Levy, Unionization and Professional Sports, 51 GEO. L.J. 749, 772
(1963).
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success elsewhere in professional sports, several fighters have discussed
unionization as a means to level the bargaining table for MMA athletes.' 70
Identification and resolution of the many policy and legal complexities
attending unionization will not be discussed here. But one interesting
threshold issue deserves mention. The National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA"), which protects the right to self-organize, extends its protections to
"employees" but not independent contractors. 171  The test for whether a
person qualifies as an "employee" under the NLRA relies on agency principles
and explores whether indicia of an employer's "right to control" are
present. 172 At first glance, MMA athletes appear to be more like independent
contractors, rather than employees. Promotional contracts often explicitly
categorize fighters as contractors (although that is not determinative) and
fighters exercise almost total control over their day-to-day activities prior to
the match. Conversely, many promotional contracts, such as those of the
UFC, are exclusive, a fact that has, in other contexts, been afforded significant
weight as evidence of "control."' 173 Furthermore, the engaged fighter's work
constitutes "an essential part of the [promoter's] normal operations," which
the Supreme Court has previously identified to be a material factor in finding
an individual to be an "employee."' 7 4  Ultimately, the "employee"
determination is case specific and heavily depends on the facts and
170. See, e.g., Posting of Gary Wimsett to SportsAgentBlog, http://www.sportsagentblog.com/
2009/02/09/pat-mileich-on-wamma-the-ufc-and-unionization/print/ (Feb. 9, 2009, 09:00 ESI)
(quoting former UFC champion Pat Miletich as remarking that "there are a lot of people talking
about forming a figher's union ... .
171. The National Labor Relations Act provides in pertinent part that "[e]mployees shall have
the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection .... " 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
172. "[]here is no doubt that we should apply the common-law agency test here in
distinguishing an employee from an independent contractor." N.L.R.B. v. United Ins. Co. of
America, 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968). The National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or "Board") has
explained that "the Board has consistently held that the Act required application of the 'tight of
control' test .... The resolution of this question depends on the facts of each case, and no one
factor is determinative." News Syndicate Co., Inc., 164 N.L.R.B. 422, 423 (1967). Common indicia
include the right to hire and fire; whether the worker profits from people under him; control of the
premises where the work occurs; whether the nature of the working relationship is permanent; the
skill required; the right to designate the location where the work occurs. See generaly N.L.R.B. v.
Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 983, 986 (7th Cit. 1948).
173. Seven-Up Bottling Co., of Boston, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 506 F.2d 596, 600 (1st Cir. 1974)
(affirming finding of employee and noting the significance of the fact that none of bottling
company's distributors "perform delivery services for anyone but the company').
174. United Ins. Co. of Ameica, 390 U.S. at 259. See also Herald Co. v. N.L.R.B., 444 F.2d 430,
433-35 (2d Cir. 1971) (newspaper distributors, although categorized as independent contractors,
qualified as employees).
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circumstance of the alleged employer-employee relationship in question.1 75 To
date neither the courts nor the National Labor Relations Board has ruled on
the issue with respect to IMA athletes.
VI. Conclusion
Over the past fifteen years, MMA has evolved from a vulgar spectacle
involving men of questionable character and ability to a legitimate sport
involving skilled and dedicated athletes. Instrumental to MMA's evolution
and path to acceptance was sensible regulation designed to protect the
competitors, ensure legitimate and entertaining matches, and limit exploitative
or undesirable relationships among the players.
Looking forward, further maturation of the sport is to be expected.
Crucial to MMA's continued development will be how successfully scholars,
industry players, and regulators collectively address two concerns: first, that
desirable regulation is not undermined by "race-to-the-bottom" forum-
shopping; and second, that MMA athletes receive equitable economic
treatment. Boxing, once among the most popular sports in the country, has
seen its status diminish, in large part because of years of failure on these two
fronts. MA should keep that in mind.
175. See, e.g., Lorenz Schneider Co. v. N.L.R.B., 517 F.2d 445, 446 (2d Cir. 1975) (employee
question requires "case-by-case determinations whether the relationship between a business
enterprise and other persons is that of employer and employee").
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